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"Certain attitudes about pregnancy and childbirth, throughout human history, have
sustained pervasive, often law-sanctioned, restrictions on a woman's place among paid
workers and active citizens.
INTRODUCTION
In 1848, a group of feminists convened in Seneca Falls, New York and issued
a document that signaled the birth of the women's movement. The Declaration
of Sentiments condemned a wide range of "injuries and usurpations on the part
of man toward woman"-everything from withholding the right to vote to
applying different codes of moral conduct-and demanded "immediate admis-
sion to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the
United States."2 Formal citizenship status was the basis for demanding the
substantive rights that full citizens enjoy-a broad spectrum of political, per-
sonal, and civil rights from suffrage to child custody to property ownership.3
The convention, and the document it produced, laid the groundwork for decades
of advocacy undertaken in the name of women's equal citizenship.
Pregnancy was not among the issues identified in the Declaration or dis-
cussed at the convention. Its absence is both surprising and curious, especially
because most of the delegates surely had felt the effects of pregnancy in their
1. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1978 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70-71 (Elizabeth
Cady Stanton et al. eds., photo. reprint 1985) (1881).
3. See id. (listing rights demanded).
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own lives. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a lead architect of the platform, gave birth to
and raised seven children and readily acknowledged "the practical difficulties
most women had to contend with in the isolated household, and the impossibil-
ity of woman's best development if in contact, the chief part of her life, with
servants and children.",4 But Stanton was ahead of her time in trying to "have it
all." Most women of the era did not aspire to equal access to paid work but
focused instead on fighting .for civil and political rights that could in most cases
be exercised without interfering with their primary roles as wives and mothers.
The civil and political rights these early advocates sought, like property
ownership and suffrage, were essential components of equal citizenship, a
substantive concept popularized in the 1950s by British social theorist T.H.
Marshall. Marshallian "citizenship" is both a measure of and an aspiration to
equal rights and duties for all members of a community. But Marshall's
framework also includes an important third dimension, social citizenship, which
entails economic security and access to paid work. Pregnancy became a more
substantial obstacle to equal citizenship when the women's movement shifted
its focus to this dimension during the second half of the twentieth century.
Pregnancy increasingly impeded women's workplace equality and, by implica-
tion, their equal citizenship as they entered the paid workforce in large numbers
after World War II and, eventually, sought access to jobs traditionally reserved
for men. Conflicts between pregnancy and work escalated in number and
degree, triggering an antidiscrimination movement that resulted in an important
piece of federal legislation, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).5
The PDA was part of a broad social movement designed to guarantee equal
employment opportunities for women. This agenda drew on new notions of
equal social citizenship for women rather than the political and civil aspects of
citizenship underlying the earlier movement.
Without a doubt, the PDA successfully opened workplace doors for pregnant
women. It brought an abrupt end to common employer policies that categori-
cally excluded pregnant women or restricted the terms on which they could
work. 6 Today, by contrast, a majority of pregnant women work in paid employ-
ment, and the vast majority of working women will become pregnant at some
point.7 The PDA also made sharp inroads against harmful pregnancy stereotyp-
4. ELEANOR FLExNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UN=rED STATES
73 (1975) (citing ELZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGI-rTY YEARS AND MORE 147-48 (1898)). Stanton implored
her friend and co-advocate, a childless Susan B. Anthony, to be patient: "Courage, Susan-this is my
last baby, and she will be two years old in January. Two more years and-time will tell what!" Id. at 90
(citing ALMA Lurz, CREATED EQUAL: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 104 (1940)).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
6. See infra section III.A.
7. SHEILA B. KAMERMAN Er AL., MATERNrIrY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 5 (1983) ("85 percent of
working women are likely to become pregnant during their working lives."); see also JEANETrE N.
CLEVELAND Er AL., WOMEN AND MEN IN ORGANIZATIONS: SEX AND GENDER IsSUES AT WORK 208 (2000)
(estimating that 75% of working women are likely to give birth at least once while working); Hal G.
Gueutal & Elisabeth M. Taylor, Employee Pregnancy: The Impact on Organizations, Pregnant
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ing and bias in the workplace, though evidence suggests that they still persist
today.8
But women's equal participation in the workforce requires more than just
open doors. The plight of pregnant workers today rests not primarily in false
assumptions about their incapacity but in the failure of current law to account
for the physical, medical, and social realities of pregnancy. Pregnancy discrimi-
nation law provides absolute protection for women only if they retain full work
capacity during the period of pregnancy and childbirth. A pregnant woman who
seeks to continue working through pregnancy, but experiences a temporary
diminishment or alteration of capacity due to the physical effects of pregnancy,
will encounter limited protection in the law. For her, the PDA only requires
employers to provide necessary workplace accommodations if they have chosen
to provide them for other temporarily disabled workers with similar levels of
incapacity. Thus, a pregnant woman who cannot perform some or all of her
duties because of the physical effects of pregnancy could be fired, or otherwise
penalized, as long as the employer would treat a similarly situated non-pregnant
employee the same way. This is true even when the employee could continue
working if the employer were to provide minor or inexpensive workplace
accommodations. The additional protection theoretically provided by disparate
impact law has proven extremely limited in the pregnancy context.
This Article argues, ultimately, that the PDA's promise of equal social
citizenship for pregnant workers has fallen short. The quest for full citizenship
requires that women have the opportunity to utilize, and benefit from, their
innate talents and capacities in multiple dimensions of society, including paid
work. Equal citizenship requires not only legal protection from unjustified
exclusion from the workforce, but also protection for a pregnant woman's right
to continue working despite the potential temporary physical limitations of
pregnancy. This protection, in turn, means that employers must be required to
provide reasonable workplace accommodations to counter the physical effects
of pregnancy. The PDA, however, is modeled on a basic formal equality
framework, which provides no absolute right to accommodation necessitated by
pregnancy. Women are thus deprived individually and as a group of the opportu-
nity to capitalize fully on their abilities in the workplace because of a legal
regime that fails to account for the predictable, and recurring, effects of
pregnancy. By not insisting that employers provide such accommodations,
regardless of whether they accommodate other forms of temporary disability,
current law guarantees that women will face more involuntary exits from the
workforce and fewer advancements and successes within it. This is particularly
so for those who labor in traditionally male-dominated occupations that are
physically strenuous or hazardous.
Employees and Co-workers, 5 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 459, 459 (1991) (estimating that 90% of working
women "will be pregnant at least once during employment"); infra text accompanying notes 10-28.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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This Article will proceed in three parts. First, it will explore the realities of
pregnant women at work. This exploration begins with data on labor force
patterns of women generally and pregnant women in particular. It then consid-
ers the current levels of pregnancy discrimination and evidence of lingering bias
against pregnant workers. Finally, it examines the effects of pregnancy on work
and the effects of work on pregnancy. An examination of medical research and
guidelines, scientific data, workforce pattern statistics, and case law reveals the
range of challenges faced by pregnant working women and their potential
consequences. Conflicts between the physical effects of pregnancy and the
existing structure of jobs and the workplace vary greatly by individual and by
job, but they are widespread and reinforce both obstacles to women's employ-
ment opportunities and long-entrenched patterns of gender-based occupational
segregation.
Second, this Article will suggest a different theoretical framework for analyz-
ing the problem of conflicts between pregnancy and work. Pregnancy discrimina-
tion law has conventionally been framed as a debate about gender equality.
Certainly it is about gender, but "equality" is a contested term that led even
feminists to divide over its definition in the pregnancy context. When the
contours of pregnancy discrimination law were tested early on, feminists split
over whether "equality" called for equal treatment or accommodation of preg-
nant workers, cementing a growing boundary between theories of formal and
substantive equality.9 This Article thus applies a new lens to the treatment of
pregnant women in the workplace. This lens, rooted in T.H. Marshall's substan-
tive notion of citizenship, helps reframe the debate and expose the limitations of
the current legal framework. Using "equal citizenship" as a multi-dimensional
concept that connotes inclusion, it reframes the equal treatment/accommodation
debate about pregnancy as a question of social citizenship, which aspires,
among other aims, to women's equal participation in the workforce.
Finally, this Article will evaluate modem pregnancy discrimination law against
the goal of equal social citizenship. Against this measure, current law falls quite
short. Though pregnancy discrimination law sharply reversed course in the
1970s, ending an era of exclusion and ushering in an era of access, it has failed
to deliver on the broader promise of women's equal social citizenship. This
failure, in a nutshell, flows from the PDA's structure, which grants rights based
primarily on a pregnant woman's capacity. Pregnancy discrimination is legally
defined to provide absolute rights only to the extent a pregnant woman is able to
work at full capacity despite her physical condition. She is protected from
employment decisions motivated by false assumptions or stereotypes about her
abilities, but not necessarily entitled to accommodations that might be essential
for her to continue to work. The PDA, with its focus on short-term (in)capacity
and neglect of innate capacity, fails to account for the actual effects of preg-
nancy and thus neglects the needs of many pregnant working women today.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 197-207.
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I. PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE
A. WORKFORCE PATTERNS FOR PREGNANT. WOMEN
A number of long-term trends have converged to produce a dramatic increase
in the number of pregnant women in the workplace such that "virtually every-
one in the labor force will be affected directly or indirectly by employee
pregnancy."1° The most fundamental shift that has led to this result is the sheer
number of women who have joined the paid workforce. Following a sharp
increase during World War 11, the number of working women has been rising at
a steady clip since the 1950s-from 29% in 1950 to 60% in 2000.11 Alice
Kessler-Harris, the leading historian on women's wage earning in the United
States, notes:
In contrast to earlier decades where, at any one time, wage-earning women
were a relatively small, if significant, minority, in the fifties their proportion
crept upward, to the point where in the sixties women who did not work for
wages became the exception.... A third of all women worked in 1950-only
half of them full time. By 1975, nearly half worked, more than 70 percent at
full-time jobs. 12
Today, 59.5% of women participate in the labor force with 75% of employed
women working on a full-time basis.' 3 Workforce participation has increased
beyond simply the number of women who work-women now work for more
years of their lives and for more hours at each job. 14 The percentage of married
women in the labor force has also increased, along with the percentage of
family income contributed by wives.15
10. Gueutal & Taylor, supra note 7, at 459.
11. See TALLESE D. JOHNSON, U.S. CENsus BuRrAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MATERNITY LEAVE AND
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF FIRsT-TIME MOTHERS, 1961-2003, at 4 n. 18 (Feb. 2008) ("Overall labor force
participation rates for women, regardless of pregnancy status, were as follows: 32 percent in 1960, 43
percent in 1970, 52 percent in 1980, 58 percent in 1990, and 60 percent in 2000." (internal citation
omitted)); AucE KEsSLER-HARRIs, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 301 (1982).
12. KESsLER-HARRI, supra note 11, at 300-01.
13. See U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK 8 tbl.2, 70 tbl.20 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf. More educated
women are more likely to work in the paid labor force. See id. at 21 tbl.8. (reporting that among women
age 25 and older with a college degree, 80% were labor force participants compared with only 68% of
those with only a high school diploma and 48% of those with less than a high school diploma).
14. See, e.g., KEssLER-HARmis, supra note 11, at 301 (observing that "where earlier wage work had
been merely a short phase of many women's lives, in the fifties it began to assume a more central
position").
15. See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHARTING THE U.S. LABOR MARKEr IN
2006, at 66 chart 6-5 (2007), http://www.bls.gov/cpsflabor2OO6/chartbook.pdf (indicating an increase in
the percentage of family income contributed by working wives from approximately 25% in 1974 to
35% in 2005). For a comprehensive analysis of women's current role in the workforce, see THE SHRIvER
REPORT, A WOMAN'S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (Heather Boushey & Ann O'Leary, eds.) (2009),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a-womansnation.pdf.
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The dramatic increase in women workers has, of course, changed the compo-
sition of the overall labor force. Women have occupied an increasing proportion
of the labor force since the 1970s, accounting today for nearly half.16 The
composition is continuing to change given that a majority of new entrants to the
labor force are women 17 and that men have been disproportionately on the
receiving end of layoffs in the current economic downturn. 18 Women, in fact,
may be "poised to surpass men on the nation's payrolls, taking the majority for
the first time in American history."19
The influx of women into the labor force set the stage for more pregnant
women and mothers to work, but that shift began later as attitudes about the
proper role of women began to change. Kessler-Harris notes that "[t]he bulk of
the increase in labor force participation in the fifties occurred among women
over forty-five-past the years when they would normally have young children
at home."20 But by the 1960s, pregnant women and mothers began to demon-
strate greater labor force entry and commitment.2 ' Women began to work more
and longer while pregnant and return sooner after childbirth. For example,
among women who had a first birth between 1961 and 1965, 44% worked
during pregnancy, compared with 67% of women whose first birth occurred
between 2001 and 2003.22 For the earlier cohort, only 40% of women worked
full-time during pregnancy, while 57% of the later cohort did.23
Women who work during pregnancy are much more likely today to work into
the third trimester than in decades past, often times until the day of delivery.
Only 35% of working women with a first birth between 1961 and 1965 were
still at work within a month of giving birth, and 13% left before the end of the
first trimester. Among those with a first birth between 2001 and 2003, only 4%
left within the first three months, and 80% were still at work a month before
16. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women in the Labor Force in 2008, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/
Qf-laborforce-08.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (reporting that women accounted for 46.5% of the
total labor force in 2008).
17. See, e.g., Gueutal & Taylor, supra note 7, at 475 (predicting that 65% of new entrants to the
labor force during the 1990s would be women).
18. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, As Layoffs Surge, Women May Pass Men in Job Force, N.Y. TIms,
Feb. 6, 2009, at Al (reporting that "a full 82 percent of the job losses [since the recession started] have
befallen men, who are heavily represented in distressed industries like manufacturing and construc-
tion").
19. Id.
20. KassLER-HA.i, supra note 11, at 302.
21. See, e.g., WuIAM B. JOHNSTON Er AL., HuDsoN INsT., WoRKFoRcE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR
THE TWENTY-FiRST CENTuRY 85 (1987) ("Much of the increase in the numbers of women in the labor
force has come from increased participation by women with children. Of the 14.6 million married
women who joined the labor force between 1960 and 1984, 8 million came from families with
children.").
22. JoHNsoN, supra note 11, at 4 tbl.1 (reporting data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of
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delivery.2 4 Working through pregnancy has thus become the norm.
Women are also returning to work much sooner after childbirth than in earlier
eras. For the earlier cohort, only 16% of women who worked during pregnancy
were back at work by three months after delivery, and only 26% were back at
work twelve months later. For the later cohort, 58% were back at work within
three months and 79% within twelve.2 5 All of these figures are even higher for
single mothers.26
The current work patterns for pregnant women vary significantly by age and
educational level. Older mothers are more likely to have worked prior to a first
pregnancy and significantly more likely to still be working within one month of
childbirth. 7 More educated mothers are also more likely to work longer into
pregnancy: 67% of women with a college degree worked within one month of
childbirth, compared with only 57% for women with less than a high school
degree.
In addition to the greater labor force participation of women in general and
pregnant women in particular, there has also been an expansion of women into
non-traditional occupations-those historically predominated by male workers.
Though a high degree of occupational segregation still persists today, women
have made steady, if small, inroads into occupations ranging from bartending to
construction to mining.29 The relatively higher pay and benefits that accompany
non-traditional occupations is a significant draw to women, who otherwise find
their economic opportunities to be less than ideal. As one mother of four
24. Id. at 7 tbl.3.
25. Id. at 14 tbl.8. Other studies show similar work patterns for pregnant women. See, e.g., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURREiNT POPULATION SURVEY, JUNE 1976-2006 tbl.5 (2008),
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/cps2006/SupFertTab5.xls (noting the increase in
the percentage of women in the labor force among those who had a birth in the last 12 months from
31% in 1976 to 56% in 2006); Sonalde Desai & Linda J. Waite, Women's Employment During
Pregnancy and After the First Birth: Occupational Characteristics and Work Commitment, 56 AM. Soc.
REv. 551, 558 (1991) (finding that 43% of mothers returned to work within three months of childbirth
and 69% returned within 12 months). These workforce patterns are not confined to the United States.
See, e.g., Geoffrey Chamberlain, Work in Pregnancy, 302 BRITISH MED. J. 1070, 1070 (1991) (noting
greater workforce participation among women and greater workforce commitment among pregnant
women in Britain).
26. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 15 tbl.9.
27. Id. at 3-4. For mothers who gave birth the first time at age 30 or older, 68% worked within one
month of childbirth, while only 56% of mothers under age 18 worked that far into pregnancy. Id. at 5
tbl.2.
28. Id.
29. See KEsSLER-HAmS, supra note 11, at 312 (noting that by. 1970 "[tihe number of women in
skilled, predominantly male, trades rose to almost half a million: an increase of nearly 80 percent over
1960, twice that for women in all occupations, and eight times that for men in the skilled trades"); see
also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, HOUSEHOLD
DATA: ANNUAL AVERAGES tbl.11 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2008.pdf (reporting that 22% of
workers in "[p]roduction, transportation, and material moving occupations" were women). See gener-
ally JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 64-87 (1989)
(analyzing trends in women's occupational choices); SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING
JUSTICE, DOING GENDER (1996) (examining women in judicial occupations).
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explained of her decision to enter the field of mining: "I like workin' in the
mines. The pay's good. That's the reason I work.",30 Non-traditional occupations
for women are more likely to include a physical component and thus, as
discussed below, more likely to trigger pregnancy-based conflicts.31
There are a variety of explanations for these convergent workforce trends.
They coincide with economic changes that increased the number of households
needing a second income in order to survive rising housing prices and infla-
tion." They also coincide with an increase in older mothers, who are more
likely to be in the workforce before a first birth.3 3 These developments also bear
some relationship to legal and policy changes that opened workplace doors to
women, including pregnant women and mothers. The enactment of laws to
prohibit sex and pregnancy discrimination reduced the number of barriers to
entry into the workforce for all women.34 Other laws, such as a federal tax
credit for dependent care adopted in 1976, also made conditions more favorable
for working mothers.35 Regardless of the explanation, the increasing number of
women working through pregnancy without concomitant reconfigurations of job
descriptions heightens the possibility for conflict between pregnant women and
employers. Section I.C takes up the nature of these conflicts, and section IV.B
considers the consequences of failing to accommodate them.
B. THE PERSISTENCE OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
Pregnant women in the workplace are now commonplace, 36 yet discrimina-
tion against them clearly persists. Pregnancy discrimination charges were among
the fastest growing category of claims filed with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) during a modem period despite a decline in the
birth rate.37 The EEOC itself is pursuing pregnancy discrimination claims more
30. Women in Blue-Collar Labor: The Numbers Grow, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY, Feb. 1983,
at 23, 23.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 283-97.
32. See JuLIA OVERTURF JOHNSON & BARBARA DowNs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
MATERNrrY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961-2000, at 2 (2005), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-103.pdf (noting background changes that contributed to the rise in
pregnant women's labor force participation); KRIsTIN SMITH ET AL., U.S. CENsUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MATERNITY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT PATrERNs: 1961-1995, at 3 (2001), http://www.census.
gov/prod/2001pubs/p70-79.pdf (same).
33. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3 ("For women 30 years and older, 9 out of 10 women who had a
first birth in 2001-2003 had worked for at least 6 consecutive months, compared with 55 percent of
women under 22 years of age.").
34. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
35. JoHNsoN & DowNs, supra note 32, at 2-3.
36. See, e.g., Sara J. Corse, Pregnant Managers and Their Subordinates: The Effects of Gender
Expectations on Hierarchical Relationships, 26 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 25, 26 (1990) (noting, based on a
variety of studies, that "[i]t is no longer unusual to see women in the workplace in the advanced stages
of pregnancy").
37. Pregnancy discrimination charges with the EEOC, which are a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit
under Title VII, increased 58% between 1997 and 2008, on top of a 10% increase between 1992 and
1996. See EEOC, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAs CoMINED: FY 1997-FY 2008
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aggressively and collecting far more in settlements than a decade ago. 38 This
surge in pregnancy discrimination charges, which includes high-profile cases
against companies like Bloomberg, Verizon, and Google, 39 serves as an impor-
tant reminder that the unfair treatment of pregnant workers is still a ripe issue,
one that has garnered substantial media attention in the last few years.4°
(2009), http://eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.htm [hereinafter, EEOC, FY 1997-FY 2008]; EEOC, PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAs COMBNIND: FY 1992-FY 1997 (2007), http://eeoc.gov/stats/
pregnanc-a.html; see also Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Birth Rate Reaches
Record Low (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/PRESSROOM03news/low-
birth.htm. For an analysis of the rise in claims, see NAT'L P'swP FOR WOmE & FAmIaus, THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION Acr: WHERE WE STAND 30 YEARS LATER 12 (2008) (noting, among other
trends, a dramatic increase in claims filed by women of color).
38. See NAT'L P'si' FOR WoMEN & FAMus, supra note 37, at 11 (noting an increase in the
percentage of EEOC-instigated lawsuits that include a pregnancy discrimination claim from 1.3% in
1997 to 8.6% in 2006). Monetary benefits paid out annually through EEOC conciliations (not including
subsequent litigation) more than doubled in the last decade, rising from $5.6 million in 1997 to $12.2
million in 2008, with an all-time high of $30 million collected in 2007 alone. EEOC, FY 1997-FY
2008, supra note 37.
39. See Elwell v. Google, No. 05 Civ. 6487 (DLC), 2007 WL 217978, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2006)(requiring employee to submit pregnancy discrimination claims to binding arbitration); Alan Feuer, 54
More Claim Bloomberg Firm Discriminated, N.Y. Tmims, May 2, 2008, at B 1 (reporting on the EEOC's
class-action pregnancy discrimination suit against a company founded by New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg, which alleges that women who were pregnant or took maternity leave suffered
undeserved demotions and pay cuts); Press Release, EEOC, Maternity Store Giant to Pay $375,000 to
Settle EEOC Pregnancy Discrimination and Retaliation Lawsuit (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/press/1-8-07.html; Press Release, EEOC, EEOC and Verizon Settle Pregnancy Bias
Suit; Thousands of Women to Receive Benefits (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/
2-26-02.htmil (reporting that Verizon agreed to pay millions to settle pregnancy discrimination claim
involving thousands of employees).
40. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, When the Stork Carries a Pink Slip, N.Y. TiEs, Mar. 28, 2009, at B6(reporting suspicion among lawyers that "some employers are now using the law's laxity and the dismal
economy to tacitly discriminate against new or expectant mothers"); Stephanie Armour, Pregnant
Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2005, at B 1 (noting "soaring" number
of pregnancy discrimination claims); Tresa Baldas, Pregnancy Discrimination Suits Are Steadily Rising,
NAT'L L.J., April 14, 2006, at 4 (noting increase in pregnancy discrimination lawsuits, "particularly
among high-level female executives who claim that they are being knocked off the corporate ladder
because of maternity issues"); Mike Drummond, Pregnant and Fired: A Rising Trend?, CHARLOTrE
OBSERVER, Jan. 7, 2007, at ID (noting increase in number of pregnancy discrimination cases won by
plaintiffs); Alison Grant, EEOC Reports Jump in Claims of Pregnancy-Related Job Bias, CLEVELAND
PLAN DEALER, Nov. 4, 2007, at G3 (reporting that "[piregnancy discrimination cases are increasing at
the same time that race and gender cases are declining"); Chrissy Kadleck, Baby Bias: Pregnancy
Discrimination Cases More Prevalent as Women, Employers Struggle to Find Common Ground in
Changing Work Force, CRAIN's CL vELAND Bus., Mar. 3, 2008, at 29 (noting that women are more
willing to fight pregnancy discrimination); Lisa Marsh, EEOC: Pregnancy Discrimination Complaints
Up Sharply, N.Y. PosT, June 11, 2006, at 35 (reporting that pregnancy discrimination had "leaped into
the news" after Verizon's $49 million settlement with the EEOC); David Mitchell, Prevalence of
Pregnancy Discrimination Surprises Advocates, Cii. DAILY LAw BuLL., May 4, 2006 (describing
pregnancy discrimination as "all too common"); Sue Shellenbarger, More Women Pursue Claims of
Pregnancy Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at DI (noting that a new EEOC call center
received over 20,000 telephone inquiries about pregnancy discrimination during 2007 and that the
EEOC reported a surge in formal charges filed); Carmel Sileo, Executive Women Drive Rise in
Pregnancy Bias Lawsuits, TRIAL MAG., July 1, 2006, at 18 (noting increase in number of EEOC
claimants that went on to file lawsuits); Anne Thompson, When Becoming a Mom Means Losing Your
Job, MSNBC.com, Mar. 31, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.comfid/l2100070/ (noting increase in preg-
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The rise in pregnancy discrimination claims, many of them successful, also
suggests the persistence of unlawful bias against pregnant workers. Thirty years
after enactment of the PDA, a report analyzing recent pregnancy discrimination
cases noted the "striking" pattern of cases that "involve straightforward viola-
tions of the PDA that seem to be fueled by a fundamental resistance to having
pregnant women in the workplace, or having to accommodate the needs of
pregnant women. 4 1
Social science studies also show the persistence of stereotyped perceptions
and decisionmaking with respect to pregnant workers. For example, one recent
study concluded that "negative stereotypes and beliefs associated with pregnant
working women do exist, and that men are more likely than women to hold
these beliefs," while another by the same researchers found that subjects
assigned consistently lower performance ratings to a pregnant worker viewed
on video than an identical, non-pregnant worker.4 2 "Pregnant women," these
researchers found, "were viewed as overly emotional, often irrational, physi-
cally limited, and less than committed to their jobs. They were not seen as
valued or dependable employees.",43 Another study found that "pregnant women
evoke hostile reactions in situations in which they stray from the traditional
feminine gender role. As a result, pregnant women may face significant ob-
stacles to successful employment." 44 A third found that "subordinates studied
tended to have more negative impressions of the pregnant manager and of their
interactions with her than they did of the manager who was not pregnant."4 5
As discussed in section 1V.A below, the current legal framework directly
targets pregnancy bias and the discriminatory employment decisions it might
nancy discrimination claims and employers' "mis-fears and stereotypes" that can lead them to engage in
unlawful actions).
41. NAT'L P'sHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 37, at 10 (concluding that recent cases reveal
"biases about both the abilities of pregnant women and their proper roles in the workplace and in the
home"); see also William M. Slonaker & Ann C. Wendt, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Empirical
Analysis of a Continuing Problem, 1991 LABOR L.J. 343 (analyzing pregnancy discrimination claims
filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission between 1985 and 1989).
42. Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance Appraisals, 14 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 649, 652, 654-55 (1993).
43. Id. at 655.
44. Michelle Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: Complemen-
tary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards That Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
1499, 1509 (2007); see also Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth
Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc. Issuas 701, 711 (2004) (reporting on study finding that "women lost
perceived competence [at work] and gained perceived warmth when they became mothers, looking
significantly less competent than warm"). On social attitudes towards pregnant women, see Shelley E.
Taylor & Ellen J. Langer, Pregnancy: A Social Stigma?, 3 SEX ROLES 27, 35 (1977) (noting, prior to
passage of the PDA, that "until the unacknowledged social rejection of pregnancy is also eliminated,
changes in law and policy may be insufficient to bring the pregnant woman back into the active
commerce of daily life"); see also Dianne Horgan, The Pregnant Woman's Place and Where to Find It,
9 SEx ROLES 333 (1983) (noting class-based differences in attitudes toward pregnant women).
45. Corse, supra note 36, at 38; see also Blythe Hamer, When the Boss Becomes Pregnant, PsYCHOL.
TODAY, Jan. 1989, at 14 ("When a woman is pregnant her coworkers expect her to behave more like a
mom and less like a boss." (citing Sara Corse)).
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produce. Pregnant workers face the same, often significant, obstacles to enforc-
ing antidiscrimination rights as any other plaintiff,4 6 but the legal analytic
framework is at least designed to combat this type of discrimination. More
robust enforcement of existing law could help eliminate the persistent bias.
Toward that end, the EEOC recently issued a "best practices" document that
makes specific recommendations to employers for purging their decisionmaking
of stereotypes about pregnant and caregiving workers.47
C. RISKS AND CHALLENGES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AT WORK
The recent surge in pregnancy discrimination claims and the resulting re-
newal of public awareness provide the occasion to reconsider the predicament
of pregnant women at work more generally. An important, yet under-examined,
aspect of pregnant women in the modem workplace is the potential for conflict
between the physical effects of pregnancy and paid work. Pregnancy is not
incompatible with physical exertion. To the contrary, the pregnant woman's
potential to do almost anything is borne out by stories of marathon runners and
others who achieve impressive goals during pregnancy and soon after child-
birth. Paula Radcliffe won the New York City Marathon less than nine months
after giving birth (and again twelve months later), having run competitively
throughout her pregnancy.48 Fantasia Goodwin, a Division I collegiate basket-
ball player, not only played competitively through her seventh month of preg-
nancy but did so without revealing her condition at all.49 Elite athletes are not
generally a good barometer for the rest of us, but their stories challenge us to
reconsider the conventional wisdom about the limits of the pregnant body.
The workplace has been long marked by assumptions about the pregnant
woman's ability with little attention to either relevant scientific data or the
advice of individual doctors. Historically, women "with child" were presumed
incapable of work, particularly in the later stages of pregnancy. Doctors rou-
tinely told working women that they had to leave work three months before an
expected delivery (if their employers had not already excluded them from the
workplace at that point). Today, the opposite presumption is often applied-
uncomplicated pregnancy has no meaningful physical effects that bear on a
woman's ability to work. The presumption of incapacity and the presumption of
uninterrupted capacity are, however, both flawed. Although some attention was
46. See generally Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859 (2008) (arguing that procedural doctrines make enforce-
ment of substantive Title VII rights unduly difficult); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555 (2001) (noting that employment discrimination claims
are harder for plaintiffs to win than virtually any other kind).
47. See EEOC, EMPLOYER BEST PRACnCES FOR WORKERS wITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES (2009),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.htmi.
48. See Gina Kolata, Training Through Pregnancy To Be Marathon's Fastest Mom, N.Y. TiS, Nov.
3, 2007, at Al.
49. See Deborah L. Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete and the Promise of Title IX, 31 HARv. J.L.
& GENDER 323, 324 (2008).
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paid to the effects of work on pregnancy earlier in the twentieth century,5 ° only
in the past few decades have scientists started studying the issue in a systematic
and rigorous way.
Medical experts now agree that there is no inherent conflict between preg-
nancy and paid work. 1 Indeed, most pregnant women work, and most working
women will become pregnant.52 As discussed above, many of these women will
work throughout their pregnancies and return to work soon after giving birth.
Yet, despite the ability of many or even most pregnant women to engage in paid
labor, pregnancy does sometimes impose real, if temporary, limitations on a
woman's working capacity.
In 1977, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), in
conjunction with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), published Guidelines on Pregnancy and Work, its first attempt at
providing science-based recommendations to guide obstetricians.53 The bottom
tine embraced the ability of most pregnant women to engage in paid work:
The normal woman with an uncomplicated pregnancy and a normal fetus in a
job that presents no greater potential hazards than those encountered in
normal daily life in the community may continue to work without interruption
until the onset of labor and may resume working several weeks after an
uncomplicated delivery.
54
Seven years later, in 1984, the Council on Scientific Affairs (CSA) also
issued a formal report, which noted that "[tihe impact of pregnancy on a
worker's ability to perform her job has only recently become an area considered
suitable for scientific inquiry.",55 It thus cautioned "against accepting the tradi-
tional standard assumptions about pregnancy as fact."5 6 The Council expressly
50. Alice Kessler-Harris notes, for example, that "Dr. Alice Hamilton, who became the first female
faculty member of the Harvard Medical School in 1911, began her career by looking into the effect of
industrial poisons such as lead on pregnant women." KEsSLER-HARms, supra note 11, at 107.
51. See L. Remez, Both Paid and Unpaid Work During Pregnancy Have Little Independent Effect on
Birth Weight, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 278, 279 (1990) (summarizing a study concluding that "in the
absence of known environmental hazards, there is no evidence that 'work per se during pregnancy
interferes with fetal growth'); see also M. J. Saurel-Cubizolles & M. Kaminski, Work in Pregnancy:
Its Evolving Relationship with Perinatal Outcome (A Review), 22 Soc. Sci. MEn. 431, 438 (1986)
(surveying studies on pregnancy and work and noting that "most recent surveys have found pregnancy
outcome more favorable for working women").
52. See supra text accompanying notes 10-31.
53. Am. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, GuIDELINES ON PREGNANCY AND WORK, Pul. No.
78-118 (1977) (written by contract for and with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health).
54. Id. at 12 (stating that the "goal of medical management is to counteract or minimize risks to the
mother or fetus, enabling her to remain on the job without concern for as much of the period of
pregnancy as possible").
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derided traditional recommendations regarding work during pregnancy as evi-
dence that "few of our standard medical beliefs about the physical and emo-
tional characteristics of pregnancy have any scientific basis. 57 CSA then issued
recommendations based on "fledgling" but "scientific" data about the impact of
pregnancy on work. It concluded, ultimately, that women without unusual
complications "should be able... to continue productive work until the onset of
labor.",58 But CSA cautioned that the determination of a pregnant woman's
ability to work "should be made on a case-by-case basis" considering "the types
of activities and tasks the job requires, the general physical condition of the
employee, and the length of gestation., 59 In addition to the general recommenda-
tion on work, the report provided guidelines about which work-related activities
could continue throughout pregnancy and which should cease at some specified
prior point. For example, the guidelines state that secretarial and professional
jobs can generally be continued to the end of pregnancy, while prolonged
standing should be curtailed after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy and
repetitive lifting of more than fifty pounds should be stopped after the twentieth
week.6 °
These agencies were prodded to adopt formal guidelines in order to aid
doctors in formulating science-based clinical recommendations for their preg-
nant working patients. As one author noted in 1979, "It is primarily the
obstetrician to whom the worker poses the questions pertinent to this relation-
ship between work and health during pregnancy, but because of his limited
knowledge and, until recently, lack of concern, he often does not provide her
with satisfactory answers to assist her in decision-making as to her continued
employment. ' '6 ' Wendy Chavkin cites a study from the late 1970s of family
medicine doctors in an industrialized area of New York that revealed limited
knowledge or interest in the interaction between their patients' pregnancies and
their jobs: "Only 25 percent of these physicians obtained occupational histories
from their pregnant patients; 65 percent offered no information to their patients
about the reproductive risks associated with work conditions; 25 percent were
not aware themselves that certain substances commonly used in industrial
settings can be hazardous to reproduction." 62
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1995, 1997. The types of complications that may be "disabling for further work" include
"preeclampsia, premature rupture of the membranes, vaginal bleeding, or threatened abortion." Id. at
1997.
59. Id. at 1996-97.
60. Id. at 1996.
61. Jacqueline Messite, Guidelines on Pregnancy and Work Developed by the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2 J. ENvTL. PATHOLOGY & ToXIcoLoGY 319, 320 (1979).
62. Wendy Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE:
WoMEN's HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HoME 196, 200 (Wendy Chavkin ed., 1984) (citing Susan
Pincus, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: The Possible Role of the Family Physician, THE N.Y.
FAMILY PHYsIcIAN).
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Despite the difficulties in conducting controlled studies of pregnant women,63
there have been some significant advances in scientific knowledge related to the
interrelationship between pregnancy and work since these initial science-based
guidelines were issued. It is still not possible to generalize very effectively
about the capacities of or risks to pregnant women at work, but we can better
identify the types of conflicts most likely to surface when pregnant women
work.
Conflicts between pregnancy and work run both ways-pregnancy can inter-
fere with job performance and job performance can interfere with healthy
pregnancy. The effects on job performance stem largely from the inevitable
physical changes that accompany a woman's pregnancy, such as weight gain, a
shifting center of gravity, a loss of balance, and unstable joints.64 "[P]regnancy
for many women restricts their ability to climb ladders, poles, scaffolding, and
stairs; lift or move heavy objects; run or walk quickly; or stretch to reach things.
During pregnancy, especially during the later stages, women may be unable,
therefore, to perform job functions that require these physical abilities. 65 In
addition, many pregnant women experience back pain that makes certain tasks
uncomfortable, even if not impossible.66 These changes can affect a woman's
ability to perform a wide variety of job-related tasks, either because she is
physically unable to do them or is unwilling to risk the potential consequences
to maternal or fetal health.6 7 But these conflicts are obviously variable. The
ACOG/NIOSH guidelines note:
Tolerance of strenuous exertion, such as lifting, pulling, pushing or climbing,
will vary widely, depending on differences in the women's physical fitness
and strength, the load handled, and the environment. The pregnant woman
may be small, large, strong, or weak. Her strength, balance, agility and
internal burdens change from month to month. Packages or loads also vary
widely in size, shape, and consistency, from a bale of towels to a case of food,
63. See, e.g., Lenore J. Launer et al., The Effect of Maternal Work on Fetal Growth and Duration of
Pregnancy: A Prospective Study, 97 BRrr. J. OasTrIUCS & GYNECOLOGY 62, 62-63 (1990) (noting
"important pitfalls" that "affect the interpretation of studies on the effect of maternal work on birth
outcome").
64. For a comprehensive description of pregnancy's physical effects, see Wendy Chavkin, supra
note 62, at 196-202; see also Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25
STETSON L. REv. 1, 3-8 (1995) (discussing scientific research about the maternal and fetal hazards in the
workplace); Jeannette A. Paul et al., Work Load and Musculoskeletal Complaints During Pregnancy, 20
SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK, ENV'T & HEALTH 153, 156-57 (1994) (noting the effect of the hormone relaxin
on joint stability during pregnancy).
65. Calloway, supra note 64, at 5.
66. See, e.g., Paul et al., supra note 64, at 157 (noting that "[h]alf of pregnant women have low-back
pain at some time during pregnancy").
67. See, e.g., J. A. Nicholls & D. W. Grieve, Performance of Physical Tasks in Pregnancy, 35
ERGONOMICS 301, 301, 304 (1992) (finding that pregnant women had more difficulty performing
thirty-two of forty-six ordinary tasks).
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or a patient in a nursing home. The job may or may not permit modification of
intensity, frequency, and pattern of its physical tasks. 68
Certain workplace policies may also be more difficult for pregnant women to
satisfy, even if they were to disregard potential hazards to themselves or their
fetuses. A no-leave policy, for example, is virtually impossible for a pregnant
woman to adhere to, given that childbirth necessitates time away from work.69
But other policies may be burdensome as well, such as those restricting the
number or timing of bathroom breaks, setting an inflexible start time for work,
or prohibiting eating or drinking during non-break work time.70
In addition to the effects of pregnancy on job performance, work can have an
adverse impact on pregnancy outcomes-both maternal and fetal-as well.
Pregnant women, their fetuses, or both face three types of potential danger in
the workplace: hazardous environmental conditions, contraindicated physical
movements, and adverse working conditions.71 First, certain environmental
conditions may make work hazardous to pregnant women, including exposure
to "hazardous chemicals, gas, dust, fumes, radiation, or infectious disease."72
Exposure to excessive heat in early pregnancy can increase the risk of neural
tube defects in the fetus. A study of women working in hospital laboratories, for
example, showed an association between exposure during early pregnancy to
certain commonly used chemicals and both miscarriage and lower birth weight.7 3
These exposures seem most likely to be dangerous during the early phases of
68. Am. COLL. OF OBSTrICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 53, at 34.
69. For discussion of the legal treatment of no-leave policies, see infra subsection IV.A.3.
70. See Calloway, supra note 64, at 6-7; Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act:
Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REv. 225, 250
(1998) (noting that even uncomplicated "pregnancies involve a certain level of discomfort that will
interrupt the workplace's daily routines" and generate the need for "frequent breaks to walk around, use
the rest room, or eat snacks"); see also, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting pregnant workers' "need to take more frequent snack and restroom breaks and the need to take
some time off, at the very least, to give birth" (citing Greenberg, supra, at 250)); Troupe v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving retail salesperson who needed to start her shift later
because of morning sickness); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, 922 F Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996)
(challenging policies that restricted the plaintiff's ability to walk away from her desk, eat at her desk,
and take short breaks, which she claimed posed a hardship because of her pregnancy).
71. Cf Chamberlain, supra note 25, at 1070-72 (summarizing chemical, physical, and biological
hazards pregnant women potentially face at work).
72. UNIV. OF MICH. HEALTH SYS., WORKING DURING PREGNANCY (2009), http://www.med.umich.edu/Illibr/
wha/wha_workwha.htm.
73. Helena Taskinen et al., Laboratory Work and Pregnancy Outcome, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED.
311, 311 (1994); see also A. D. McDonald et al., Fetal Death and Work in Pregnancy, 45 BRIT. J. INDus.
MED. 148, 156 (1988) (finding an excess rate of late miscarriages and stillbirths for "operating room
nurses, radiology technicians, and agricultural and horticultural workers," suggestive of the "possibility
of some fetotoxic agent or agents in these occupations"); M. J. Saurel-Cubizolles et al., Work in
Operating Rooms and Pregnancy Outcome Among Nurses, 66 INT'L ARCHIVES OF OCCUPATIONAL &
ENVTh. HEALTH 235, 236 (1994) (finding higher rates of spontaneous abortion among women who
worked in an operating room while pregnant or were exposed to anesthetic gases, formol, and ionizing
radiation during early pregnancy).
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pregnancy. Perhaps ironically, the "peak physiological efficiency that character-
izes pregnancy may be a double-edged sword, magnifying a pregnant woman's
effective exposure to environmental hazards. 7 4 As Wendy Chavkin explains, a
pregnant woman is likely, for example, to inhale more of a dangerous gas
because of changes in her respiratory function, to absorb more of an inhaled gas
into fatty tissue because of greater blood flow, to absorb more fat-soluble toxins
because of increased fatty tissue, and to eliminate toxins from her blood stream
more slowly because of the greater proportion of fat.7
Second, the same physical movements that are difficult for pregnant women
to perform can be associated with adverse consequences when they are per-
formed without modification.76 Studies have also shown that increased physical
workload can result in a greater likelihood of an adverse pregnancy outcome as
well as pain or injury to the woman. Finally, there may be adverse effects
from job conditions like irregular hours, shift work, or psychological stress. 78
Some studies have found that working a night shift poses a risk for pregnant
women.79 Although there is still much more to be learned about the effects of
74. See Chavkin, supra note 62, at 199.
75. Id. at 198-99.
76. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 64, at 14-15 (citing studies); cf Paul et al., supra note 64, at 155
(noting the variation among women, individually and across different cultures, in their "willingness and
motivation to perform activities that can harm herself or her unborn child").
77. See, e.g., Launer et al., supra note 63, at 68 (finding that "high levels of physical demand both at
home and in the workplace adversely affected birthweight"); Tuula Nurmimen et al., Physical Work
Load, Fetal Development, and Course of Pregnancy, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK, ENV'T & HEALTH 404,
412-13 (1989) (finding association between certain types and intensities of physical effort at work and
adverse pregnancy outcomes but also noting the need for further research); cf. Taiat J. Hassan et al.,
Excessive Physical Work During Pregnancy and Birth Weight, 16 AsIA-OCEANIA J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 17, 19 (1990) (finding, in a study of the effect of excessive physical work during
pregnancy on birth weight, that the "margin of safety is great for ordinary work," but "potential effects
on the fetus are manifested if extreme work is done as seen in this study"); Paul et al., supra note 64, at
153 (noting frequency of "muskoskeletal complaints" among pregnant women and work postures that
might aggravate them).
78. See, e.g., Maureen Hatch et al., Do Standing, Lifting, Climbing, or Long Hours of Work During
Pregnancy Have an Effect on Fetal Growth?, 8 EPIDEMIOLOGY 530, 535 (1997) (finding, as other studies
have, that "a shorter work week during pregnancy appears to be advantageous for the fetus"); D.
Hollander, Improving Work Situations During Pregnancy May Help Improve Outcome, 32 Ir'L FAM.
PLAN. PERSPS. 156, 156 (2006) (concluding that "the odds that an infant was small for gestational age
increased steadily with the number of risky conditions present at the beginning of pregnancy; they were
30% higher among women with 4-6 conditions than among those with none" (internal citations
omitted)); cf. Lis Wiehl, Red Door Salons: Red Faced or Right?, Fox NEWS, Aug. 20, 2008, http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,407202,00.html (reporting on employee's lawsuit against Elizabeth
Arden for refusing to allow her to deviate from the mandatory sixty-hour work week when reduced
hours were necessitated by pregnancy complications).
79. See, e.g., Claire Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work Schedule During Pregnancy, 4
EPIDEMIOLOGY 73, 73-74 (1993) (finding, based on a study of 331 pregnant women, that "women who
always worked evenings or nights were at a substantially higher risk of pregnancy loss compared with
women who were fixed day workers"). But see Gosta Axelsson et al., Outcome of Pregnancy in
Relation to Irregular and Inconvenient Work Schedules, 46 BuR. J. INDUS. MED. 393, 397 (1989)
(concluding that their study "did not support the hypothesis that night work is associated with an
increased risk of miscarriage").
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work on pregnancy,80 workplace accommodations can be used to eliminate or
reduce many known and potential dangers. An accommodation can make the
job easier for the pregnant woman to perform or make the pregnant woman or
her fetus safer while performing the job. The law regarding pregnancy accommo-
dations is discussed in section IV.A below.
II. WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
Pregnancy discrimination law, like most contemporary women's rights issues,
has developed under the framework of equality. But "equality" is hard to define
and thus hard to measure, and disagreements over its proper definition have led
to significant shortcomings in legal protection for pregnant workers. Despite a
formal commitment to equality of the sexes in American constitutional and
statutory law since the 1970s, many institutions, as well as aspects of women's
private lives, remain deeply gendered. It is tempting to see equality in gender
neutrality or in formal mandates of equal treatment. Yet, as the longstanding
feminist debate about the need for a more substantive definition of equality
reveals, formal equality can leave women as a group behind by failing to
account for, among other things, sex-based differences. Given disputes about -its
proper definition, equality provides at least a partially unsatisfactory benchmark
for measuring an important bottom-line: whether women who formally possess
equal rights are actually full and equal participants in society.
This Article thus turns to full or equal "citizenship" as a standard by which to
evaluate pregnancy discrimination law. Though itself a contested concept,8 '
citizenship provides a substantive- framework that can be used as a benchmark
for assessing women's progress towards equality generally, as well as for
critiquing current law's treatment of pregnant women at work.
A. THE CITIZENSHIP FRAMEWORK
The notion of citizenship is a broad one. Though certainly used to describe
one's legal status or nationality,82 "citizenship" is also used more broadly to
connote the rights and benefits that accrue to full members of society.83 "Citizen-
ship," in the words of T.H. Marshall, "is a status bestowed on those who are full
members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to
80. For example, a recent study found that working at all after thirty-six weeks is associated with a
four-fold increase in the risk of a first-time cesarean delivery. Sylvia Guendelman et al., Maternity
Leave in the Ninth Month of Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes Among Working Women, 19 WOMEN'S
HEALTH IssuEs 30, 33 (2009).
81. See, e.g., Barbara Hobson & Ruth Lister, Citizenship, in CONTESTED CONCEPTS IN GENDER AND
SOCIAL PoLmcs 23, 23 (Barbara Hobson et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the debate over "citizenship").
82. See JUDITH N. SHKLA, AMERIcAN CrrzENSmp: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 4 (1991) ("Citizenship as
nationality is the legal recognition, both domestic and international, that a person is a member,
native-born or naturalized, of a state.").
83. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. Rv.
1161,1185 (2008).
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the rights and duties with which the status is endowed."8 The dual meaning of
citizenship is reflected in the rhetorical "second-class citizen-someone who is
denied full rights and recognition of membership in society" despite having
formal citizenship status.
85
Perhaps because of its broad "emancipatory potential, ' 86 the citizenship
framework has been widely used in social theory and progressive politics. 87 As
Linda Bosniak notes, "[p]olitical and legal thought today are suffused with talk
of citizenship;" it is used to express "the highest fulfillment of democratic and
egalitarian aspirations. 88 However commonly the concept is deployed though,
it still has its critics. Modem invocations of citizenship have been criticized, for
example, for focusing exclusively on the rights attendant to citizenship rather
than its demands or obligations. 89 This criticism seems fair, though not necessar-
ily a reason to avoid a rights-based use of the citizenship framework. It counsels
instead for a broader conception of citizenship or a sequential consideration of
the obligations that follow rights.90
The citizenship framework has been perhaps most severely criticized because
of its potential for exclusion.9 Some feminists, critical race theorists, and
immigration scholars have argued that "citizenship" should not be invoked in
progressive movements because it is an "inherently exclusionary concept,"
operating to the detriment of some of society's most vulnerable members.92
While the potential for exclusion is real, the citizenship framework remains
useful, uniquely so in some sense, in the context of gender.
One way to limit the potentially exclusionary effects of the citizenship
framework is to detach the notion of substantive citizenship from formal
citizenship status. The term "citizenship" can be used to connote belonging,
84. T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CrnIZslIP, AND SocIAL DEvELOrPmarr: ESSAYS BY T.H. MARSrALL 84
(1964); see also Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (2002)
("Equal citizenship is understood to entail enjoyment of various kinds of rights-civil rights, political
rights, social rights, and cultural rights-but all of these rights are described in the language of
citizenship. Enjoyment of these rights is viewed as a necessary condition for the enjoyment of equal
citizenship in our society.").
85. Bosniak, supra note 84, at 500.
86. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 513 (2007).
87. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage, 94 Nw. U. L. REv.
963, 966 (2000) (noting that "the subject of citizenship has recently enjoyed a remarkable renaissance
in Anglo-American scholarly thought").
88. LINDA BOSmAK, THE CmzEN AND THE ALIEN: DnEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 1 (2006).
89. See, e.g., RuTlr LISTER, CnizElsinP: FEMINST PERSPECrivEs 21-23 (2d ed. 2003); see also Bosniak,
supra note 87, at 967 (noting that "newer literature is expressly critical of approaches that reduce
citizenship to a 'mere status' or collection of rights").
90. We should consider, for example, whether women's right to work comes with an obligation to
engage in paid work.
91. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 83, at 1188-89 (considering critiques of "citizenship" as a
framework for assessing societal inclusion).
92. Id.; LisTER, supra note 89, at 43 ("Inclusion and exclusion represent the two sides of citizenship's
membership coin. Whereas much of the literature on citizenship has traditionally focused on its
inclusionary face, more radical contemporary writings tend to portray citizenship as a force for
exclusion.").
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participation, or membership in society more generally. As an aspiration, it can
be applied to all members of society, regardless of their formal citizenship
status. Indeed, central commitments to equality in the United States, embodied
in the Equal Protection Clause and important federal antidiscrimination laws,
are guaranteed to all residents regardless of formal citizenship status.9 3 We can
thus draw on the citizenship framework as a proxy for measuring the integration
of marginalized or disadvantaged groups into society without limiting its vision
to legal citizens. Ruth Lister concludes: "While not denying the ways in which
legal definitions of citizenship and citizenship practices can exclude ... outsid-
ers and act more generally as a disciplinary force, as an ideal it can also provide
a potent weapon in the hands of disadvantaged and oppressed groups of
insiders."9" If we are careful to distinguish between the two meanings of
citizenship, both can be used.95
This distinction is reinforced by scholars who suggest alternative language to
capture the notion of substantive citizenship. Kenneth Karst, for example,
articulates the concept as "belonging"-an insistence that "the organized soci-
ety treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who
'belongs."' 96 Judith Shklar ascribes "standing" to the range of rights and
benefits due each member of society.97 Many other scholars have also used
alternative terminology to describe their vision of an inclusive society in which
all members have the opportunity to make use of their- natural talents and
abilities and to participate in public life.98
Even with the potential for exclusion, it would be a mistake to abandon a
concept that has figured prominently, both rhetorically and substantively, in the
struggle for gender equality. As an historical matter, women's rights advocates
93. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984) (holding that "employees"
includes documented and undocumented aliens for purposes of applying the National Labor Relations
Act); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to legal
and illegal aliens); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) ("We agree that aliens are
protected from discrimination under [Title VII].").
94. LisTER, supra note 89, at 5.
95. See, e.g., BOSi1AK, supra note 88, at 120-21 (discussing ways to resolve tension between internal
and external notions of citizenship).
96. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term: Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977). See generally KENNerH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CnIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
97. See SHKLAR, supra note 82, at 2-3.
98. Gretchen Ritter, for example, uses "citizenship" to describe only one's formal legal status and
"civic membership" to refer to the "broader political, legal, and social meanings that attach to one's
place within the polity." See GRErCHEN RrrrE, THE CoNsTTmTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC
MEMBERSHP IN me AMeucAN CoNsrrroNAL ORDER 6 (2006); see also Jennifer Gordon & R. A.
Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2493, 2494-95 (2007) (arguing that "belonging" requires "the realization by individuals and
groups of genuine participation in the larger political, social, economic, and cultural community").
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in the United States have long pitched their.arguments in citizenship terms.99
The Seneca Falls platform, for instance, used the language of the Declaration of
Independence to assert that female citizens should have the same rights as male
citizens.1°° Much women's rights litigation, from the late nineteenth century
until the 1970s, pushed this citizenship-based theory of rights, though often
without success. A woman barred from voting in an 1872 election, for example,
challenged a Missouri law restricting suffrage to men by arguing that all citizens
must be eligible to vote.' The Supreme Court rejected her claim, concluding,
in Judith Resnik's words, that women "were citizens but citizens of a special
sort, possessing not all of the attributes of citizenship that men had."' 0 2 Argu-
ments for other women's rights such as jury service and equal employment
opportunity likewise drew on the language and notion of full citizenship.1
0 3
Early advocates were rebuked by courts and policymakers who viewed wom-
en's physical and social differences as sufficient justification for differential
treatment of two groups of citizens. Yet the claim to full citizenship-beyond
formal status-defined the early women's rights movement. Modem citizenship-
based claims thus draw on a long tradition, one that continues to resonate today.
Later generations of women's rights advocates continued to invoke the
concept-although not necessarily the precise language-of full citizenship to
challenge exclusion and to demand rights."°4 As Alice Kessler-Harris has
written, as early as the 1950s,
[w]omen asked for equal access to employment not as a special favor to help
them maintain their fitness to perform home roles, but as their right as
members of a free-market economy that theoretically offered the opportunity
to compete to all who wished to try. They defended their request in the
language of individualism, insisting that every person had a responsibility to
live up to her own capacities.'
0 5
99. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Differ-
ence?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1141 (1994) (noting the centrality of "citizenship" arguments in women's
fight for equal service on juries).
100. See DECLARATION OF SENTIrmENs, supra note 2; FLEXNER, supra note 4.
101. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
102. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1739 (1991).
103. See generally Grossman, supra note 99. Alternative arguments, particularly those rooted in
gender difference, were also employed, often alongside citizenship-based arguments. See id. at 1145-
55.
104. Other civil rights movements have made similar use of the notion of citizenship. Ruth Lister
has pointed out that the disability rights movement in the United Kingdom has "presented itself as a
movement for full citizenship rights" and that the gay and lesbian rights movement "has also begun to
deploy the language of citizenship." LISTER, supra note 89, at 5-6; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1689, 1690 (2001) (describing the
conventional narrative of citizenship as one in which "the guarantee of 'equal citizenship' can identify
and invalidate forms of discrimination now deemed to impose a second-class citizenship (such as
sexual orientation, disability, and maybe even poverty)").
105. KEssLER-HAums, supra note 11, at 310.
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While citizenship is not as central today in women's rights advocacy or
litigation, the notion of avoiding "second-class citizenship" continues to ani-
mate courts and policymakers. Legislative history of antidiscrimination laws is
replete with calls to end the lesser citizenship status of women, people of color,
the disabled, and other historically disadvantaged groups. Justice Ginsburg
invoked the idea of equal citizenship explicitly and powerfully in United States
v. Virginia, in which the Court struck down the Virginia Military Institute's
longstanding male-only admissions policy.1 16 There, she wrote that "[n]either
federal nor state government acts compatibly with equal protection when a law
or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature--equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities."10 7 We
thus cannot discount the powerful connection between citizenship and women's
rights, which ultimately outweighs the concerns about exclusion.
B. DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
The reliance on citizenship as a substantive measure requires some attention
to its multiple dimensions. In his classic exposition, T.H. Marshall divided
substantive citizenship into three parts: civil, political, and social.
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom-
liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice .... By the
political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political
power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector
of the members of such a body.... By the social element I mean the whole
range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized
being according to the standards prevailing in the society.108
Marshall claimed that these dimensions of citizenship develop in this particu-
lar order.1 9 The history of women's rights in the United States follows this
pattern-whether or not that is always the case-and bears out the idea that
different strands of the citizenship bundle can be acquired at different times.'1 0
Women were never denied legal citizenship solely on the basis of their sex in
106. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
107. Id. at 532.
108. See MARSHALL, supra note 84, at 71-72.
109. Id. at 74-78 (describing the evolution of these parts of citizenship).
110. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 83, at 1185 ("Although at first glance citizenship appears to
function as a unitary package, upon closer inspection it is clear that these aspects of citizenship can and
do operate independently of each other."); cf Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (observing
that the "lack of political equality" demonstrated by the denial of suffrage to women "[was] not of itself
decisive" on the question whether the state could impose restrictive hours legislation on the basis of
sex).
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this country,11 1 but they went more than a century without the central political
right of suffrage. The ruling in Minor v. Happersett that not all citizens must be
eligible to vote aptly illustrates this point.1 2 Married women were long de-
prived of property ownership and contract rights,1 13 disabilities that were
gradually removed by the married women's property acts.114 Even after passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment, women were openly denied the equal right to
serve on juries and equal access to the workplace. 5
C. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
Marshall spoke of his final dimension-social citizenship-as encompassing
"a modicum of economic welfare and security. ' 16 William Forbath has argued
that the "social citizenship tradition" in the United States has "centered on
decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic
independence and democracy."'1 7 The right to work has been an important,
though not the exclusive,1 18 component of the struggle for social citizenship. 19
Vicki Schultz notes that "[a]t crucial times in our history, including the New
Deal, the labor movement, the civil rights movement, and strands of the
women's movement have championed an affirmative conception of the right to
111. Women did lose their U.S. citizenship when they married non-citizens until the Cable Act was
passed in 1922. See LINDA KERBER, No CONSITrurtoNAL RIGHT TO BE LADIS 42 (1998).
112. See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
113. Under the principles of coverture, a woman's legal identity was subsumed by her husband's
during marriage. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WE IN AMERmCA: A HISTORY 93 (2002).
114. See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J.
1359 (1983).
115. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (upholding Florida's jury selection system
that granted automatic exemptions to women based on assumptions about their family responsibilities
and availability for service); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948) (upholding Michigan's
prohibition on female bartenders unless the bar was owned by a woman's husband or father). See
generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 HARv. L. REv. 947, 1012 (2002) ("Soon after ratification, the judiciary moved to repress
the structural significance of women's enfranchisement, by reading the Nineteenth Amendment as a
rule concerning voting that had no normative significance for matters other than the franchise."); see
also Grossman, supra note 99, at 1116 (concluding that women's equal right to serve on juries was not
cemented until J.E.B. v. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
116. MARsHALu, supra note 84, at 72.
117. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MicH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1999).
118. The concept of social citizenship has also been important in the debate over constitutional
welfare rights. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FoRDH"i L. REv. 1821 (2001); Karst, supra note 96, at 40-41; Dorothy E. Roberts,
Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563 (1996).
119. See, e.g., MARsHALu, supra note 84, at 75 ("In the economic field the basic civil right is the right
to work, that is to say the right to follow the occupation of one's choice in the place of one's choice,
subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical training."); Bosniak, supra note 84, at 501
(describing conventional accounts of citizenship in which "the relationship of work to citizenship is one
of necessity; a person needs to have access to decent work in order to enjoy equal citizenship");
Forbath, supra note 117, at 12 ("mhe social meaning of equal citizenship must include the opportunity
to earn a livelihood that enables one to contribute to supporting oneself and one's family in a minimally
decent fashion.").
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work as the basis for a robust, equal social citizenship."'' 20 Unlike civil and
political citizenship, however, which are consistent with the liberal theory
tradition of "negative rights," social citizenship entails not only the removal of
state-sponsored barriers to participation, but also more affirmative efforts to
promote inclusion of historically marginalized or disadvantaged groups., 2'
Women's struggle for equal social citizenship emerged at scattered points in
history but began in earnest in the 1960s. Greater access to work was a central
component of second-wave feminism, which targeted a wide range of exclusion-
ary policies and practices that hampered women's employment opportunities.1 22
Advocates won key legislative successes like the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972. They also scored significant litigation victories to establish a broad
scope for newly passed antidiscrimination laws, 23 rulings which dovetailed the
Supreme Court's embrace of a constitutional right of sex equality. 2 4 These
successes, along with an evolution of social attitudes about women's proper
place, opened the American workplace to women, a dramatic step in their quest
for social citizenship. 125
Many scholars have explored work and equal citizenship, revealing a com-
plex and multi-faceted interrelationship. 12 6 Work facilitates political participa-
120. See Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. Rev. 1881, 1888 (2000).
121. See id. at 1938 (arguing that "[p]aid work has the potential to become the universal platform for
equal citizenship it has traditionally been imagined to be, but only by attending to the specific needs of
various social groups and individuals to ensure participation parity").
122. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27. Cf Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old
Way, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 765, 765 (2000) (describing the 1960s and 1970s as "a period of 'social
citizenship"').
123. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (invalidating employer's
fetal-protection policy, which prohibited non-sterile women from holding jobs involving lead exposure
in a battery manufacturing plant); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989)
(interpreting Title VII to prohibit employment decisions motivated by sex-role stereotyping), super-
seded on other grounds by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (establishing that sexual harassment is an actionable form of
intentional sex discrimination); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (establishing the
"sex plus" theory of discrimination that can be used to challenge employment policies or decisions
based on sex plus a neutral characteristic).
124. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (invalidating Alabama law providing that only
husbands could be ordered to pay alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (invalidating
Oklahoma's sex-based drinking-age law); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973)
(invalidating federal law presuming wives of servicemen to be dependent while requiring husbands of
servicewomen to prove dependency in order to earn benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971)
(striking down Idaho law preferring male to female relatives as estate administrators).
125. The "opening" is demonstrated, among other ways, by the statistics cited in section L.A supra.
Cf Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommoda-
tion, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 25 (1996) (noting that the ADA was premised on the goal of "equality of
opportunity," which "encompasses the opportunity to lead as valuable and satisfying a life as the rest of
the population").
126. There is also a connection between citizenship as a legal status and work. See, e.g., Bosniak,
supra note 84, at 499.
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tion rights by supporting the development of individual autonomy necessary to
exercise them. As Ruth Lister argues, a primary justification for recognizing
social rights as citizenship rights is because "they help to promote the effective
exercise of civil and political rights by groups who are disadvantaged in terms
of power and resources." 1 27 Wage-earning is associated with independence, and
independence with citizenship. 128 The workplace also provides a forum for
exerting democratic influence. Cynthia Estlund argues that work provides "a
significant deliberative forum" that facilitates individuals' participation as citi-
zens. 129 Judith Shklar argued that voting and earning are the two most important
components of citizenship: "We are citizens only if we 'earn.'
130
Work is important beyond its facilitation of democratic participation. Vicki
Schultz has argued that "jobs create people" because they shape individuals'
behavior and self-conception.1 31 Sociologists have long argued that work is
intricately linked to self-identity,1 32 but work also affects conceptions of others
and standing in the community.1 33 As Kenneth Karst has written, "[i]n our
society, as much as anywhere else in the world, work is a means of proving
yourself worthy in your own eyes and in the eyes of others." 134 Paid work also
has proven tangible benefits to the individual, including greater psychological
well-being and economic security, and to society. There is little research on the
well-being of pregnant female workers, but there is some evidence that they
experience these benefits as well. One review study concluded that "several
studies find that when working conditions are suitable, working during preg-
nancy is beneficial to the psychological well-being and financial status of the
pregnant women."'135 Finally, and most faithfully to Marshall's conception of
127. LISTER, supra note 89, at 17.
128. See, e.g., ALaCE KESSLER-HARRiS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSE-
QUENCES 31-32 (1990).
129. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEo. L.J.
1, 53 (2000); see also LINDA C. McCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMniEs: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALIrY, AND
RESPONSIBILrrY 93 (2006) (noting that an "appeal to 'social citizenship' would accept the premise of the
important link between work and citizenship, and would argue for a right to decent, satisfying work as a
component of responsible self-government"); Eddie A. Jauregui, The Citizenship Harms of Workplace
Discrimination, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347, 348 (2007) (summarizing literature on connection
between citizenship and democratic or political citizenship and arguing that workplaces are the sites
"where we learn about each other, work together, and exchange social and political views").
130. See SHKLAR, supra note 82, at 67; see also MARSHALL, supra note 84, at 80 (arguing that those
who needed the protection of the state were by definition not citizens; the poor were entitled to public
subsidy as an alternative to citizenship rather than an incident of it).
131. See Schultz, supra note 120, at 1890.
132. See, e.g., ROsABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 3 (1977) (arguing that
"the job makes the person").
133. See SHKLAR, supra note 82, at 63 ("It is in the marketplace, in production and commerce, in the
world of work in all its forms, and in voluntary associations that the American citizen finds his social
place, his standing, the approbation of his fellows, and possibly some of his self-respect.").
134. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. 523, 532 (1997).
135. Helen Pattison & Harriet Gross, Pregnancy, Work and Women's Well-Being: A Review, 10
WORK & STRESS 72, 84 (1996).
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social citizenship, work provides a link to economic security for individuals and
their dependents. 136 Given these many benefits of paid work, it is not surprising
that the social citizenship tradition has focused so intently on access to it.
D. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE DEBATE OVER GENDER EQUALITY
Despite the concerted (and often successful) efforts feminists have deployed
to increase women's access to the workplace, 137 it would be misleading to
suggest that there is no disagreement among them about the importance of paid
work or ambivalence about its centrality to social citizenship. In addition to
scholars like Vicki Schultz who have argued persuasively about the value of
paid work for women, recent popular press books, such as Linda Hirshman's
Get to Work or Leslie Bennett's The Feminine Mistake, have taken up the
mantle as well-imploring women to break the cycle of trading paid work for
economic dependence. 138 But, at the same time, others have argued, also
persuasively, that the tendency to valorize work narrowly reflects the perspec-
tive of white or upper/middle-class women. These critics have pointed out
several ways in which the conventional account of work neglects the experi-
ences, needs, and desires of other groups of women. Laura Kessler, for ex-
ample, observes that "[w]ork has meant equal citizenship primarily for white,
straight, economically privileged women and men; it has been a significant
source of exploitation for women and men of color, lower-class whites, and gay
people, many of whom have historically occupied the bottom rungs of our wage
economy."1 39 Neil Gilbert aptly suggests that the benefits of work tend to be
overstated because feminists who write about work tend to have relatively more
136. See Forbath, supra note 117, at 16-17, 82-83, 90 ("Equality of worth, not in dollars but in the
sense of having an opportunity to earn one's livelihood, is essential."); Karst, supra note 134, at 531,
534 ("Whatever other meanings work may bear, for most of us it is a crucial means of sustaining
ourselves and our families."); Schultz, supra note 120, at 1945-47.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25; infra text accompanying note 191.
138. LESLIE Be4Nmi.rs, THE FEMININE MISTAKE: ARE WE GIVING Up Too MucH? at xxiii-xxiv (2007)
("It has become inescapably clear that choosing economic dependency as a lifestyle is the classic
feminine mistake."); LINDA R. HIRsHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD 2
(2006) ("Bounding home is not good for women and it's not good for the society. The women aren't
using their capacities fully; their so-called choice makes them unfree dependents on their husbands.").
139. Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 72 (2005); see also, e.g.,
Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 BuFF. L. REv. 915, 918 (2008) ("[T]he emphasis on wage work as
the most promising path to women's liberation (rather than on a more robust welfare state, for example)
also potentially underacknowledges the problem that safe, well-paid, fulfilling work may not be
available for many women."); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983) (exploring the ways in which federal welfare policy both
interferes with women's equality in the wage labor market and devalues work at home); Deborah L.
Rhode, Response Essay: Balanced Lives, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 834, 836 (2002) (rejecting "the premise
that [paid] employment is always necessary or sufficient to a life well lived"); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers' Decisions About Work at Home and in
the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1029, 1036-37 (2004) ("Advocacy of waged work as the principal
means for women's emancipation disregards the experiences of most women of color in particular....
Black women historically experienced work outside the home primarily as an aspect of racial subordina-
tion and the home primarily as a site of solace and resistance to white oppression."); Michael Selmi &
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satisfying and desirable jobs. He points out:
The voices of those in the privileged occupations speak most often of their
own felicitous work experiences and their perceptions of the gratification that
men in their circles reap from work. It is an authentic assessment based on a
self-referential slice of reality, which fails to reflect the working lives of a
large proportion of women and men in jobs marked by stress, tedium, and
emotional exhaustion.'
40
Other feminists have critiqued the social citizenship tradition for its preoccu-
pation with paid work and its failure to acknowledge the value or prevalence of
care work done disproportionately by women.14 1 Martha Fineman, among
others, has warned against defining citizenship by reference to paid work, given
that women shoulder substantially more of the burden of providing unpaid care
and domestic work, regardless of whether they also engage in paid work. 42
This critique calls for greater recognition of "the importance of caregiving as a
form of social contribution,"' 143 which could take the form of greater governmen-
tal support for care work, 44 legal reforms to treat family work the same as paid
labor,145 or a reformulation of the citizenship tradition to make care work a
"ground for conferring citizenship." 146
This alternative conception of social citizenship can be pursued either in
conjunction with the approach described above-encouraging appreciation for
both paid work and family care--or in lieu of it. There is, however, a tension in
feminist scholarship about whether these are mutually exclusive or complemen-
Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GErDE L. & POL'Y
7 (2006) (bringing class issues into discussion of women and work).
140. NEIL GILBERT, A MOTHER'S WORK: How FEI msM, THE MARKcEr, AND POLICY SHAPE FAImY LIFE
113 (2008).
141. LISTER, supra note 89, at 23 (noting feminist critique of a conception of citizenship that exhibits
"contemporary preoccupation with paid work obligations" and "tends to ... discount[ care] as an
expression of active citizenship responsibility"); MCCLAN, supra note 129, at 94 (identifying an
"important limitation in the social citizenship tradition: its inattention to the gendered economy of care,
that is women's disproportionate responsibility for caregiving, and how this responsibility limited their
full participation in the labor market and their access to forms of economic security tied to employ-
ment").
142. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 280 (2004).
See generally ARLIE HOCHsCImLD, THE SECOND SHFT: WORKING PARENTS AND Tme REVOLUTION AT HOME
(1989). Data on current patterns of household work are available at Mothers and More, http:/
mothersandmore.org/pressroomlstatistics.shtml (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
143. McCLAIN, supra note 129, at 94.
144. See, e.g., id. (refocusing the historical tradition of social citizenship would "posit governmental
responsibility to facilitate women's and men's participation in paid employment and family work"
(emphasis added)). See generally FINEMAN, supra note 142.
145. Supporters of this approach have advocated for, among other things, permitting family care-
givers to accrue social security benefits. See, e.g., ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY
THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD Is STILL THE LEAST VALUED 262-63 (2001); Katharine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 38-41 (1996).
146. Joan Tronto, Care as the Work of Citizens: A Modest Proposal, in WOMEN AND CIIZENSHIP 130,
131 (Marilyn Friedman ed., 2005).
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tary goals. Ruth Lister explains this tension:
These [dilemmas] crystallize around the question: who is a social citizen? In
other words, are women's claims to social citizenship rights best couched in
the language of equality with men, around the 'male' model of citizen-the
worker, or in the language of difference, around the 'female' model of
citizen-the carer? Or is it possible to transcend the policy dilemma through a
model of citizen the worker-carer, which embraces both women and men?
More specifically, is the aim to change the nature of social citizenship rights
so that earning is no longer privileged over caring in the allocation of these
rights? Or is it to improve women's access to and position in the labour
market so that they can compete on equal terms with men and can thereby
gain the same employment-linked social citizenship rights?
147
There is no easy resolution to these dilemmas. In my own view, there are costs
to urging both accounts of social citizenship. The push to equalize paid and
unpaid work as a means to women's equality risks recreating the separate
spheres of ideology that feminists sought hard to overcome. The perception of
women, in Vicki Schultz's words, as "inauthentic workers" is reinforced by
models that assume different social roles for men and women and paid work
obligations that suit those roles. 148 But regardless of whether we expand our
vision of social citizenship for women, equal access to meaningful, paid work
remains an essential component.
The concept of equal social citizenship can be used as both goal and
"yardstick."1 49 As a normative goal, it cannot be achieved without grappling
with the problem of pregnant workers. Pregnancy presents a challenge for both
feminist accounts of social citizenship because it often renders women tempo-
rarily incapable (or less capable) of performing their jobs, but not necessarily
interested in converting their efforts to unpaid labor during or after pregnancy,
even if society accords greater value to such work. They are thus denied equal
social citizenship by the mere fact of pregnancy. When dealing with pregnant
workers, and the potential conflicts between the physical effects of pregnancy
and their jobs, the law must tend towards protecting their right to work despite
potential temporary impairments. Yet, as explained in section IV.A, current law
backs away from this task entirely.
Ill. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION LAW: FROM EXCLUSION TO ACCESS
Legal protection against pregnancy discrimination at work was a 1970s
invention and brought about a stark turnabout in the treatment of pregnant
working women. An era of exclusion gave way to an era of access as a legal
147. LisTER, supra note 89, at 167.
148. Schultz, supra note 120, at 1892-1919.
149. See Hobson & Lister, supra note 81, at 36.
(Vol. 98:567
PROMISE OF EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
regime that once permitted employers to bar pregnant women from the work-
place with impunity was replaced with one that mandated pregnancy-blindness.
This section will first consider the history of the exclusion of pregnant women
from the workplace. It will then identify the key points in the development of
contemporary pregnancy discrimination law in the twentieth century. Finally, it
will focus on specific shortcomings of current law that compromise women's
struggle for workplace equality and, in turn, for equal citizenship.
A. THE ERA OF EXCLUSION
Prior to the 1960s, there was no formal commitment in federal law to gender
equality or even gender neutrality. Like women generally, pregnant women
worked (or did not work) at the whim of states and employers, which could
restrict their labor force participation for good reasons, bad reasons, or no
reason at all. The idea of pregnant women doing paid work inspired a blend of
reactions, from a paternalistic desire to protect them from the perils and
demands of paid labor, to stereotypes about their physical capacity or willing-
ness to service the "ideal worker" norm, to concerns about "lewdness" because
pregnancy resulted from sex. 150 These very different concerns all militated in
favor of excluding pregnant women partially or fully from the workforce. And,
indeed, sex-differentiated employment policies-ranging from hiring criteria to
working conditions to benefits-were commonplace. As Katharine Bartlett has
noted, "[t]hat women may and do become pregnant is the most significant single
factor used to justify the countless laws and practices that have disadvantaged
women for centuries.,
15 1
In the workplace, pregnant women were certainly no better off than women
generally. Employers that hired women sometimes excluded pregnant women or
hindered their ability to work in ways that were unique to their condition. To the
extent the law took account of women, it was primarily in the form of
exclusionary or protectionist legislation, popular especially during the first part
of the twentieth century. All women were potentially pregnant women, whose
reproductive'function needed to be carefully guarded and preserved, and states
took it upon themselves to protect women's reproductive functions by imposing
special limits on their working conditions.
The Supreme Court endorsed protectionist legislation for women in Muller v.
Oregon, in which it upheld a 1903 state law restricting the number of hours
women could work per day in factory or laundry jobs.1 52 After an employer was
fined ten dollars under this law for ordering a female employee to work one
150. See generally Courtni E. Molnar, "Has the Millenium Yet Dawned?": A History of Attitudes
Toward Pregnant Workers in America, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 170-76 (2005); see also
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE's DARK SECRS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTA-
TION, PROPRETY, AND PRIVACY 171-72 (2007).
151. Katharine T. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REV.
1532, 1532 (1974).
152. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908).
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longer day, he challenged the law under Lochner v. New York, in which the
Court had invalidated a similar law restricting the hours of all bakery employees
on a theory of economic substantive due process. 153
The defendant in Muller argued that Oregon could no more limit the number
of hours a woman could work in a laundry than it could limit the number of
hours a man could work in a bakery. The Court upheld the protectionist law,
despite acknowledging that by the time this law was challenged, women in
Oregon, married or single, possessed the same rights of contract and property
ownership as men. 154 Equal rights of contract-civil citizenship, to use T.H.
Marshall's typology--did not guarantee female workers identical treatment.
Rather, a "woman's physical structure, and the functions she performs ...
justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which
she should be permitted to toil.' 155 The Court in Muller disassociated women's
claims to citizenship and suffrage from the right to work on even terms,
concluding that "political, personal, and contractual" equality would not change
the protection required by "her physical structure and a proper discharge of her
maternal functions."' 156 Work, in other words, could be carried out only if
consistent with a woman's primary functions of childbirth and childrearing. 157
Oregon's concern was not simply with preserving women's physical capacity
to reproduce, but also with their ability to fulfill the broader mandates that came
with the deeply entrenched separate spheres ideology.' 58 But certainly a core
assumption underlying the Oregon law, and the Supreme Court's approval, was
153. See 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Alice Kessler-Harris notes that Lochner fueled the shift to
sex-specific protective legislation: "Since the courts rejected the assertion that the general welfare
demanded regulation for all workers, proponents moved to the position that women in their capacity as
child bearers and rearers served the state's welfare in a special way." KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 11, at
184.
154. Muller, 208 U.S. at 418.
155. Id. at 420.
156. Id. at 422.
157. The Wisconsin Supreme Court made this point quite explicitly in an 1875 case, in which it
upheld the denial of admission to the first woman who applied to the state bar. In re Goodell, 39 Wis.
232 (1875). It was "wise" to exclude women from the legal profession because "[t]he law of nature
destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of children of our race and for the
custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor." Id. at 245. The court
conceded that some women might need employment, as "cruel chances of life ... may leave women
free from the peculiar duties of their sex," but concluded that "it is public policy to provide for the sex,
not for its superfluous members; and not to tempt women from the proper duties of their sex by opening
to them duties peculiar to ours." Id.
158. There were, of course, many other cases prior to 1970 in which courts permitted states or
employers to treat women differently out of concern for safeguarding their reproductive capacity and
home-and-hearth responsibilities. Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, in which he
justified the exclusion of women from the Illinois state bar, is often quoted and illustrative of this type
of reasoning. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well
as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.").
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that for women work and reproduction are simply incompatible. The Court was
heavily persuaded by the Brandeis brief, which highlighted
over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of
hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the
effect that long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of
their special physical organization.... Perhaps the general scope and charac-
ter of all these reports may be summed up in what an inspector for Hanover
says: "The reasons for the reduction of the working day to ten hours--(a) the
physical organization of women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing
and education of the children, (d) the maintenance of the home-are all so
important and so far reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be
discussed."
' 159
Although the Court conceded that the brief cited to sources that "may not be,
technically speaking, authorities," it viewed the special needs and limitations of
pregnant and potentially pregnant workers to be "matters of general knowl-
edge."'160 The Oregon law was upheld based upon a sweeping, and apparently
constitutional, presumption of incapacity for pregnant and potentially pregnant
women.
The ruling in Muller left in place laws and policies excluding women from
certain occupations or limiting the terms upon which they could work in others,
which were operative in almost half of the states. 16 1 It also fueled a new round
of statutory enactments restricting women's work hours and cemented the
normalcy of different rules for men and women at work. Alice Kessler-Harris
notes that the "surprising absence of controversy about such legal prohibitions
reveals the strength of popular beliefs in women's assigned roles.' 62 Many
commentators have pointed out, though, that women-only protectionist policies
were iot adopted across the board. As Deborah Rhode has noted, "sex-based
protective labor legislation that prevailed throughout the first half of the twenti-
eth century frequently 'protected' female employees out of jobs desirable to
males," while safety concerns were "notably absent in discussions of women's
far more grueling labor in farm and domestic settings."' 163 They were concen-
trated, instead, in occupations with relatively higher pay that were not domi-
159. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 n.1.
160. Id. at 420-21.
161. ld. at 419 n.1.
162. KEssLER-HAmUUs, supra note 11, at 186, 188 (noting, also, that nineteen states adopted new
protective laws for women between 1909 and 1917); see also Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws
Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. ENw. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2007).163. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEx: THE DENtIAL OF GENDER INEQUALrrY 34 (1997); see also
Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1219,
1237-39 (1986) (observing that "[fletal vulnerability policies excluding all fertile women have been
adopted only in male-dominated industries," while "women are generally allowed to work in women's
jobs without restrictions based on fetal safety"); David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, Gender Justice, and the
Justices: The Limits of Equality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 101, 115 (1992) ("Expressions of corporate
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nated by women. The laws also tended to protect "motherhood" only for the
white and relatively privileged.
Whether by design or effect, protectionist labor policies reinforced occupa-
tional segregation by gender and the pay and prestige that came with those
patterns.' 64 The legal landscape for working women did not begin to change
until passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which banned
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, 165 and the Supreme Court's
adoption of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for sex-
based classifications in a series of cases in the early 1970s. 166 Even then,
though, and despite the huge influx of women in the workforce, it was common
for employers to single out pregnant women for special, often adverse, treat-
ment with respect to hiring criteria, conditions of employment, and benefits. 167
Against a backdrop of the burgeoning law of sex equality, working women
began to push back and demand accommodations from their employers, as well
as to deal practically with the conflicts they faced. The 1982 pamphlet, "The
Pregnant Miner," offering practical tips for women managing pregnancy while
working in coal mines, is a great example of such local, pragmatic efforts. 168
Women were also bringing claims of pregnancy discrimination to the EEOC
shortly after the agency was established in 1965, only to find that the subject
had been given little, if any, thought on the federal legislative or administrative
level. With the help of a powerful group of advocates, the EEOC issued its first
pregnancy discrimination guidelines in 1972, stating that Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination extended to pregnancy discrimination. 169
Equality-based rights for pregnant workers did not follow automatically from
rights of women generally. Despite the tangible gains for working women, and
the EEOC's declaration that pregnancy discrimination was unlawful, the Su-
preme Court twice ruled in the 1970s that pregnancy discrimination is not a
concern for the plight of fetuses ... have been highly selective. Businesses that depend heavily on
women workers have been much less scrupulous about the dangers they impose on the unborn ....").
164. See KEssLFR-HAIs, supra note 11, at 181 ("Protective legislation divided workers into those
who could and could not perform certain roles. It therefore bears some of the responsibility for
successfully institutionalizing women's secondary labor force position.").
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. 2009). The act makes it "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to.. . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of ... sex." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Equal Pay Act was adopted a year earlier but
was relatively narrow in focus and did not have the sweeping potential of Title VII. See Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
166. The Supreme Court began the movement towards heightened scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), before settling on "intermediate
scrutiny" for sex-based classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
167. See, e.g., WoMEN's WORK, MEN's WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 46-47 (Barbara F. Reskin
& Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986); see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 11, at 180-214.
168. BRENDA BELL & JUNE RusmrAN, COAL EMPLOYMENT PROJECr, PREGNANT AND MINING: A HANDBOOK
FOR PREGNANT MINERS (1982). My thanks to Judith Scott, General Counsel to the Service Employees
International Union, for bringing this pamphlet to my attention.
169. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (2008).
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form of sex discrimination. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court upheld
California's statewide disability insurance program for private employees, which
covered most disabilities but specifically excluded those resulting from dipsoma-
nia, drug addiction, sexual psychopathy, and normal pregnancy.1 70 Plaintiffs had
invoked the Court's recent rulings establishing heightened scrutiny for sex-
based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, but Justice Stewart's
majority opinion insisted that they did not apply because exclusion of preg-
nancy did not constitute a sex-based classification. The Court explained: "The
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons.... There is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and
men are not." 17 The Court deemed it obvious that there was no connection
between the "excluded disability and gender."1 72 This ruling put an end to the
claim that pregnancy discrimination, barring proof of pretext, is a form of
unconstitutional sex discrimination. 173 It also cemented the notion that the
federal Equal Protection Clause guarantees only formal equality-the right of
similarly situated persons to be treated the same-and provides essentially no
protection in cases of real gender difference.
Two years after Geduldig, the Supreme Court applied this same reasoning to
Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.174 The Court upheld the exclusion
of pregnancy from a private employer's disability plan, similar to the one
upheld in Geduldig, against a Title VII challenge. 175 In ruling that Title VII did
not prohibit pregnancy discrimination, the Court rejected EEOC guidelines and
the rulings of seven federal courts of appeals reaching the opposite conclu-
sion. 176 Justice Brennan, in dissent, observed: "Surely it offends common sense
170. 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
171. Id. at 496-97 & n.20. This opinion has been rightly lampooned for its reasoning, which is
essentially the same as holding that a law that discriminates against bachelors does not discriminate on
the basis of sex.
172. Id. at 496 n.20.
173. Geduldig was applied as recently as 1993 in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Services, in
which the Court held that discrimination against women who seek abortions is not a form of sex
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993). William Eskridge has
made the argument that Geduldig has essentially been supplanted by the statutory protections against
pregnancy discrimination but concedes that the case itself remains good law. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., America's Statutory "Constitution," 41 U.C. DAvis L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2007). But see Reva B. Siegel,
You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58
STAN. L. REv. 1871, 1873 (2006) (arguing that Geduldig and Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), can be read together to provide that "where regulation of pregnant
women rests on sex-role stereotypes, it is sex-based state action within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause").
174. 429 U.S. 125, 137-40 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-155, 92 Stat. 2076.
175. Id. at 127.
176. Id. at 140-41; id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a recent dissent, Justice Stevens
described Gilbert as the "one notable exception" to the Court's usual "method of interpretation." Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 506 n.3 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. "When faced with classes of
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to suggest ... that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the
minimum, strongly 'sex related.' '
177
After Gilbert, women had no basis for challenging a pregnancy-based employ-
ment policy unless they could make a showing that it was merely a pretext for
sex discrimination. The Court did, however, invalidate one policy, in Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, which forced pregnant women to take leave and then denied
them their previously accumulated seniority when bidding for new positions
afterwards. 178 As the Court read Gilbert, employers were not required to
provide benefits to "one sex or the other 'because of their differing roles in the
scheme of human existence,"' but neither could they "burden female employees
in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities."
179
Together, these rulings left pregnant women in essentially unguarded terrain.
Fifteen years after the Supreme Court first began to acknowledge that sex
discrimination might be unconstitutional, and twelve years after Congress de-
clared sex-based employment decisions to be unlawful, women still had no
equality-based right against pregnancy discrimination. Pregnancy-based policies
were presumptively neutral and subject to challenge only upon proof of pretext
for sex discrimination or, in the case of employers covered by Title VII,
actionable disparate impact. Not all employers discriminated on the basis of
pregnancy, 180 but those that did ran little risk of legal consequences.
B. THE ERA OF ACCESS
Despite, or perhaps because of, the Supreme Court's stumbles in Geduldig
and Gilbert, the 1970s marked the transition from exclusion to access for
pregnant workers.181 During that decade, the Supreme Court recognized limited
due process protection against exclusion or ejection from the workforce because
of pregnancy. More importantly, Congress passed landmark legislation to pro-
tect pregnant employees from discrimination in 1978. Fifteen years later, Con-
gress adopted a gender-neutral leave law that would give some pregnant women
an additional measure of job security. This section will describe the constitu-
individuals or types of discrimination that fall outside the core prohibitions of anti-discrimination
statutes," Justice Stevens wrote, "we have consistently construed those statutes to include comparable
evils within their coverage, even when the particular evil at issue was beyond Congress' immediate
concern in passing the legislation." Id. at 505.
177. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. 434 U.S. 136, 137 (1977).
179. Id. at 142 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17).
180. Though the Court had upheld California's disability system in Geduldig, the law was later
amended voluntarily to provide coverage for pregnancy-based disability. See 1979 Cal. Stat. 2034-36
(codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE § 18135 (Deering Supp. 2009)).
181. The 1970s marked more broadly the transition into the modem era of sex equality. Most
importantly, developments relating to contemporary women's rights issues have their origins in or
around that decade. On the history of "second-wave feminist strategies to reallocate the unpaid work
and the economic burdens associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing," see Deborah
Dinner, Reproductive Work: From Social Rights to Individual Rights, 1966-1978 (2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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tional and statutory components that compose modem pregnancy discrimination
law.
1. Limited Due Process Protection for Pregnant Workers
During the same year it rejected an equal protection-based right against
pregnancy discrimination in Geduldig, the Supreme Court invalidated aspects of
public school mandatory leave policies for pregnant teachers. At issue in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur were policies from two school
districts forcing pregnant teachers to leave work early in their pregnancies.
182
One school district also forced teachers to wait three months after childbirth
before returning to work, regardless of their individual condition or capacity.
183
There, the Court invoked the Due Process Clause, with its long-established
protection for rights related to reproduction-contraception, abortion, and chil-
drearing, among other privacy-based rights-to conclude that policies like these
infringed "'one of the basic civil rights of man."' 18 4 But the Court's ostensible
concern was procedural, not substantive. It invoked the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine-then emerging, now defunct-to strike down the challenged poli-
cies. 185 The twin assumptions that no pregnant women were fit to work after the
fourth month and that no new mothers were fit to work until three months after
childbirth were deemed sufficiently arbitrary as to fail constitutional scrutiny. 1 86
The school boards could ensure competence and continuity of instruction
without presuming all pregnant women equally incapacitated by their condition.
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion the following year in Turner
v. Department of Employment Security, a case challenging a provision of Utah's
unemployment compensation rules that prohibited a pregnant woman, because
of presumed incapacity, from collecting unemployment benefits from twelve
weeks prior to her due date until six weeks after she actually gave birth.18 7 In a
per curiam opinion, the Court struck down this provision because "[i]t cannot be
doubted that a substantial number of women are fully capable of working well
into their last trimester of pregnancy and of resuming employment shortly after
childbirth."' 88 In effect, LaFleur and Turner created a due process right against
stereotyping for pregnant workers. States and public employers could not
182. 414 U.S. 632, 634 (1974).
183. Id. at 635 n.1.
184. Id. at 639-40 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
185. Id. at 644-45. On the demise of this doctrine, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl L. Levinson, The
Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1237-38 (1998) (noting that
the Court "threw in the towel" on this doctrine, which was awkwardly used to remedy "substantive
concerns" with "procedural restrictions").
186. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 651.
187. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 44 (1975) (per curiam). In 1982, Congress
passed the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, which specifically prohibits states from denying unemploy-
ment compensation "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(12) (2006). On the historical prevalence of pregnancy exclusions in state unemployment
laws, see K.mERmAN Er AL., supra note 7, at 37.
188. Turner, 423 U.S. at 46.
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conclusively presume them incapable by the mere fact of pregnancy without
running afoul of federal due process protections. As the Court stated in a later
case, "women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not
be forced to choose between having a child and having a job."' 89 These cases
reflected a shift in constitutional thinking about the propriety of legislating for
the general rule rather than the exception: states were not entitled to assume any
pregnant woman was incapable of work even though many of them might well
be. The same shift was occurring simultaneously in equal protection doctrine as
the Court began to insist, for the first time, that laws reflect individual character-
istics or circumstances rather than generalizations about women's abilities or
roles. 90
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Outrage over the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
gave rise immediately to the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant
Workers, a coalition that first proposed, and ultimately secured, a new law
banning pregnancy discrimination. 19' The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 (PDA) heralded a new era for pregnant workers: equal access to the
workplace. The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... 1
92
The first clause of the PDA redefines "sex" in the list of prohibited characteris-
tics to include "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. ,1 93 This
new definition had the effect of overruling Gilbert by declaring pregnancy
189. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
190. Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 63 (1961") (upholding Florida's automatic jury-service
exemption for all women based on family responsibilities, even though not all women had such
obligations), and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(using the legal disabilities imposed on married women to justify exclusion of all women from the
practice of law), with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (refusing to uphold
statutory scheme that presumed servicewomen's husbands to be independent and servicemen's wives to
be dependent).
191. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 627-28 (1991). Federal law, here, was a follower rather than a
leader. By the time, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted, half of the states had fair
employment laws that also protected workers against pregnancy discrimination. COMM. ON EDUC. &
LABOR, PROMITION OF SEX DISCRIINATION BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
193. Id. The PDA merely amends Title VII; it thus applies to the same employees and employers.
Title VII only applies to employers with at least fifteen employees. Id. § 2000e(b).
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discrimination to be a form of sex discrimination that can be challenged with
any otherwise available theory of liability. 194 The Act was introduced "to reflect
the 'commonsense' view and to insure that working women are protected
against all forms of employment discrimination based on sex."
19 5
This clause embraced the same anti-stereotyping rule embodied in the ruling
in LaFleur. The mere fact of pregnancy, in other words, should not determine a
woman's employment status or rights. Rather, she should be judged with
pregnancy-blinders based solely on her actual capacity. The PDA "was pre-
mised on the core principle of equality to establish the importance of basing
hiring decisions on individual merit and qualifications, rather than stereotypes
and assumptions." 196 Because of its broad prohibition on pregnancy-based
policies or decisions, and the broad reach of Title VII, the PDA almost single-
handedly ended the era of exclusion. Employment policies and practices that
reflected false assumptions about pregnant women, as well as those that re-
flected animosity or hostility toward pregnant women, were now invalid.
The meaning of the second clause of the PDA, which directs that pregnant
women be treated the same "as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work,"' 97 was not self-evident. Second-wave feminists had
converged on formal equality theory-the idea that women have the right to be
assessed individually rather than as a group and the right to be treated like men
to the extent they are the same-as the primary tool to break down barriers to
women at work and elsewhere. But there was more disagreement about the best
way to approach equality when there were relevant sex differences. 98 The
194. A facial policy that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy is invalid unless the employer
proves non-pregnancy to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). See infra note 228 and
accompanying text. Additionally, pregnancy discrimination may be challenged under a disparate impact
theory, but such a claim provides only limited opportunity for success. See infra subsection IV.B. 1.b.
Finally, intentional acts of pregnancy discrimination against an individual or a class can be challenged
under either the pretext or mixed motive model of disparate treatment. Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant
with Pbssibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 819, 836-54 (2001).
195. S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3 (1977).
196. NAT'L P'sHn' FOR WOMEN & FAmms, supra note 37, at 13; see also S. REP. No. 95-331, at 3
("As the testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption that women will become
pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable
disparate treatment of women in the workplace."); id. at 6 (noting that general policies regarding
pregnant employees "have long-term effects upon the careers of women and account in large part for
the fact that women remain today primarily in low-paying, dead-end jobs").
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
198. See generally Rrrre, supra note 98, at 242-60. The disagreements over the appropriate theory
of equality predated this debate. As Serena Mayeri explains, "[slince the early 1920s, American
feminism had been divided, often sharply, into two opposing camps," one insisting that "an ERA
eliminating all legal distinctions between men and women was necessary to secure women's equal
status in American society," the other fighting for "protective labor legislation ... they believed [to be]
essential to the well-being of working women." Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Femi-
nism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REv. 755, 762 (2004); see also Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 955 (1984) (arguing that "an equality
doctrine that denies the reality of biological difference in relation to reproduction reflects an idea about
personhood that is inconsistent with people's actual experience of themselves and the world").
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"equal treatment" feminists urged formal equality-pregnant women should
receive only what other temporarily disabled workers receive-in order to
promote better conditions for all workers and to avoid promoting harmful
gender stereotypes.1 99 "Special treatment" or "accommodation" feminists," in
contrast, urged a substantive equality model, advocating for accommodation of
pregnancy and childbirth when necessary to ensure equal outcomes for men and
women in workplaces that were developed around the needs and abilities of the
prototypical male worker.20 ' The debate over the merits of formal versus
substantive equality has been important in other contexts as well, but interpreta-
tion of the PDA provoked the sharpest conflict.20 2 At its core, this was a dispute
about the most effective way to promote workplace equality for women.
This conflict peaked in the 1980s in two cases challenging the meaning of the
PDA's second clause. In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry,
an employer challenged a Montana law requiring maternity leave, alleging that
it was inconsistent with the PDA's guarantee that pregnant workers be treated
"the same as" other temporarily disabled workers. 20 3 Three years later, a similar
issue arose in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, a case in
which the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a California law,
which required employers to -provide up to four months unpaid leave for
pregnancy- or childbirth-related disability, had been preempted by the PDA.2°
The equal treatment and accommodation coalitions split in both cases about the
proper interpretation of the PDA's second clause.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted an accommodation approach in Miller-
Wohl, permitting the state to insist on maternity leave regardless of whether
leave was provided for comparably disabled workers.20 5 The U.S. Supreme
Court followed suit in Guerra, concluding the PDA's second clause operated as
a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the benefits that could be made available to
199. See, e.g., Wendy 0. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WomEN's RTS. L. REP. 175, )96-97 (1982); Wendy 0. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325,
351-52 (1985). The ACLU adopted an official policy statement in 1985 supporting this approach. See
Documents: ACLU Policy, Pregnancy Discrimination, CwIL LERTIEs, Spring 1985, at 8 ("[T]he ACLU
does not support laws, regulations, policies or practices which treat persons affected by pregnancy
differently from other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.").
200. The accommodationists were colloquially referred to as the "West Coast Feminists," the equal
treatment group as the "East Coast Feminists."
201. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohi Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513,
537-57 (1983); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375,426-30 (1981).
202. The debate provoked much legal scholarship. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118
(1986).
203. 692 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Mont. 1984), vacated by Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus.,
479 U.S. 1050 (1987), reinstated by Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 744 P.2d 871, 874
(Mont. 1987).
204. 479 U.S. 272, 274-76 (1987).
205. Miller-Wohl, 692 P.2d at 1254.
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pregnant workers.2 °6 They could not, in other words, be treated any worse than
other temporarily disabled employees, but they could be treated better. Under
this interpretation of the PDA, employers can choose to provide no benefits or
leave for disability without violating the PDA, but cannot exempt pregnant
women from the benefits they do provide; they are also permitted to provide
benefits only for disability related to pregnancy, excluding disabilities attribut-
able to all other causes.20 7
3. The FMLA and State Leave Laws
During the 1980s, the focus of legislators and advocates shifted to a gender-
neutral leave law as a means of resolving some of the conflicts faced both by
pregnant women and parents who worked in the paid labor force. After an
eight-year, hard-fought battle, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA) was enacted.2 ° 8 The FMLA provides eligible employees with up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year if needed to care for a newborn or newly
adopted child, to care for a seriously ill family member, or to attend to one's
own serious health condition. 20 9 Because FMLA leave is unpaid, its real appeal
is job security, as well as the continuation of employment benefits during
leave.2 1 °
Although the FMLA reaches broadly to enable workers to better balance the
varying demands of illness and family care with employment, it protects
pregnant workers in two specific ways. A pregnant employee can take "serious
health condition" leave, intermittently or for a continuous period, to seek
prenatal care or to stop working because of pregnancy-related disability.2 11 A
pregnant woman can also take FMLA leave as needed for childbirth and to care
for a newborn child.2 12 As useful as it might be for some workers, the FMLA
has been widely criticized for some obvious shortcomings: the available period
of leave is short, regardless of the duration of the necessitating circumstance;
206. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396
(9th Cir. 1985)).
207. The adoption of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 imposed additional requirements
on employers with respect to many disabled workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). As discussed
below, it has been held inapplicable in most cases to pregnancy-related disability. See infra note 253
and accompanying text.
208. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-03, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006)). On the legislative history of the FMLA, see Joanna L. Grossman,
Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
17, 36-39 (2004).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (c). To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must have worked at
least 1250 hours in the previous year for an employer with at least fifty employees within a
seventy-five-mile radius of where the employee reports to work. Id. § 2611(2).
210. See Grossman, supra note 208, at 20.
211. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.112 (2006) (prenatal care leave); id. § 825.114(a) (work incapacity leave);
id. § 825.117 (intermittent leave).
212. See id. § 825.112(a)(1) (childbirth and newborn care leave).
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almost 40% of American employees are not eligible for FMLA protection; 2 13
and many eligible to take leave forego it because it is unpaid.2 14
State laws improve upon the FMLA in some respects and thus fill part of the
federal law gap. The FMLA sets forth the minimum leave covered employers
must provide to eligible employees; states are free to raise the floor or sweep in
additional employers or employees. According to a summary compiled by the
National Partnership for Women and Families, the women's advocacy group
(then called the Women's Legal Defense Fund) that drafted and pushed the
FMLA through Congress, state law is more generous than federal law in many
instances. 21 5 Even with the limits noted, federal and state leave laws form an
important part of the law that protects pregnant working women.
A last note on protection against pregnancy discrimination: an enormous
number of workers, many of them women, are not covered by state or federal
antidiscrimination laws. Domestic workers, for example, are generally excluded
from Title VII's protection because their employers will not meet the fifteen-
employee minimum.2 16 The FMLA applies only to even larger employers, those
with at least fifty employees.2 17 Thus, when we focus our lens on pitfalls of
current law, we should be mindful of those who do not benefit from existing
protections at all.
IV. EVALUATING THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
Without question, the PDA opened doors to the workplace, and the FMLA
has made it easier for some women to stay at a job or leave and return despite
short-term interruptions in working capacity. The PDA was used to invalidate a
wide variety of traditional policies, practices, and stereotypes that had kept
pregnant women from entering the workforce or continuing in their jobs during
or after pregnancy. These protections have enabled pregnant women and moth-
213. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., DEP'T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE tbl.A2-3.1 (2000), available at http://www.
webharvest.gov/pethO4/20041118135457/http://www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/APPX-A-2-TABLES.htm.
214. See id. at tbl. 2.17, available at http:l/www.webharvest.gov/pethO4/20041118135126/htt.ll
www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter2.htm#2.2.4 (reporting that 77.6% of leave-needers listed ability to
afford as one of the reasons for not taking leave); see also Greenberg, supra note 70, at 247-48 (noting
specific limitations of FMLA for pregnant women).
215. See NAT'L P'sHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILEs, STATE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS THAT ARE
MORE EXPANSIVE THAN THE FMLA, http:/lwww.nationalpartnership.orgsite/DocServer/Statesandunpaid-
FMLLaws.pdf?docLD=968 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). On the advocacy groups behind the FMLA, see
generally RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: How CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW (1995); Janet
Benshoof, The Truth About Women's Rights, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 427 (2000); Donna
Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the
Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 239 (1994).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
217. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(.4)(A)(1) (2006).
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ers to increase dramatically their labor force participation. 218 But does the law
go far enough in promoting women's equal social citizenship? Section III lays
out the key components of federal pregnancy discrimination law. But a mere
description of these components can be misleading because it fails to reveal the
gaps. This section considers in more detail the nature of the rights provided to
pregnant workers, focusing specifically on the role capacity plays in the assign-
ment of rights. With its failure to account for the physical effects of pregnancy
that may temporarily affect working capacity, current law virtually ignores the
increasingly common problem of conflicts between pregnancy and work.
A. RIGHTS FOR PREGNANT WORKERS UNDER CURRENT LAW
Advocates of the PDA sought to eliminate pregnancy as a basis for employ-
ment-based decisionmaking. They wanted employers to see pregnant women
not as pregnant, or even as women, but as workers, a focus that flows naturally
from the long history of exclusionary policies based on false assumptions about
pregnant women's abilities and desires. The resulting legal framework thus tries
to force attention on individual capacity rather than the generalized attributes of
pregnant women. This emphasis on capacity has made possible some important
gains but has fallen short of protecting a pregnant woman's right to work.
1. The Right to an Individualized Assessment of Capacity
The central guarantee of pregnancy discrimination law today is the right of
pregnant workers not to be presumed incapable. This was the right claimed-
and granted-in LaFleur by women who did not want to be told, as a group,
when they were too pregnant to continue working or not recovered enough to
come back.21 9 The Supreme Court acknowledged that these were individual
decisions: "[T]he ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work
past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an individual matter.
220
Applied the following year to Utah's unemployment compensation law, this
right meant that Mary Ann Turner was entitled to a "more individualized
approach" in assessing her actual capacity and availability to work-and thus
her eligibility for unemployment benefits-rather than simply being deemed
ineligible on the basis of her condition.22i
The constitutional protection prohibits state laws and public sector employers
from utilizing presumptions of incapacity, but the PDA grants the same right to
women who work for employers covered by Title VII. Policies and decisions
cannot be based on an employee's pregnancy separate and apart from any
effects of that condition on her ability to work. Pregnancy-blindness was an
218. See supra section I.A.
219. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974).
220. Id. at 645.
221. See Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (per curian).
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intentional thrust of the PDA222: "[T]he treatment of pregnant women in
covered employment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual
effects of that condition on their ability to work." 223
The right to individualized assessment is, in essence, a right against stereotyp-
ing. In Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the defendant
employer could not fire a woman who announced her pregnancy "simply
because it believes pregnancy might prevent the employee from doing her
job. '224 The plaintiff, Jessica Maldonado, was hired as a part-time bank teller, a
job that required her to be available six days a week to cover for vacationing
full-time tellers, especially over the summer. Her supervisor fired her after
learning of her pregnancy with a probable due date in July. 225 But the court
reversed summary judgment for the employer because it acted without "suffi-
cient specific evidence (apart from general assumptions about pregnancy) that
[she] would require special treatment., 226 Maldonado had not declared she
would need time off and even intimated that she might terminate the preg-
nancy. 2 7 The employer thus had acted prematurely in discharging her for the
failure to comply with the requirements of the job.
Individual determinations of pregnant women's capacity have been bypassed
in contexts where courts have deemed it impracticable. Take, for example, the
relatively common policy of airlines of restricting flight attendants from flying
during all or part of pregnancy. Many of these policies predate the PDA but,
somewhat puzzlingly, have survived it. In a series of cases in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, courts upheld airline policies mandating the layoff of flight atten-
dants at a certain point during pregnancy on the theory that their condition
rendered them less able to ensure the safety of the passengers. To pass legal
muster, the employer defending a facial policy singling out pregnant women for
special employment rules must demonstrate that not being pregnant is a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 28 In Harriss v. Pan American World
222. AMENDING TILE VII, Civwm Rmiorrs ACT OF 1964, S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3-6 (1977).
223. Id. at 4.
224. 186 F.3d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 1999); cf Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365
F.3d 107, 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (permitting a woman to proceed with a claim of sex discrimination
because her employer assumed that her status as a mother would mean that she would not devote
herself sufficiently to the job).
225. Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 764.
226. Id. at 768; see id. at 769 ("The PDA makes it unlawful for an employer to assume that pregnant
women will be less productive than other employees."). For other cases refusing to permit employers to
act based on false or premature assumptions about a pregnant worker's capacity, see, for example, Troy
v. Bay State Computer Group, Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1998), upholding plaintiff's jury verdict
where employer terminated her out of a belief that "she was likely thereafter to have a poor attendance
record," and Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1998), upholding plaintiff's
jury verdict where employer refused to permit her "to return to work before it was aware of [the
plaintiff's] actual physical capabilities."
227. Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 765.
228. Under the current formulation, a BFOQ is established when the qualification is (i) "reasonably
necessary to the essence of the business"; and either (ii) "all or substantially all individuals excluded
from the job involved are in fact disqualified," or (iii) "some of the individuals so excluded possess a
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Airways, Inc., for example, female flight attendants unsuccessfully challenged
the airline's "stop" policy that required a woman to disclose her pregnancy
within twenty-four hours of becoming aware of it and immediately commence
an unpaid sick leave, and the "start" policy, which permitted them to return to
work no sooner than sixty days following delivery. 229 The court in Harriss
upheld the forced leave policy for flight attendants based on a non-pregnancy
BFOQ. It deferred to the trial court's factual findings that the essence of an
airline's business is safe travel, that the ability of flight attendants to operate at
full capacity is "vital to emergency management," and that pregnant attendants
are more likely to be impaired during an emergency due to fatigue, nausea,
vomiting, or miscarriage.210 It was thus justifiable, according to the court of
appeals, to impose a mandatory leave policy on all pregnant flight attendants for
the entire duration of their pregnancies.231 In other cases, courts have upheld
variations of forced leave policies for pregnant flight attendants.232 These cases
are anomalous, however. Outside of the airline context, current law protects the
right to individual consideration of capacity. As explained below, this right does
nothing for a pregnant woman who is actually incapable of performing her
duties, but it does protect the woman who does not fit the stereotypes about
pregnancy-induced incapacity.
2. The Right To Work if Fully Capable
The right of individualized assessment is simply a predicate for exercising a
more substantive right: the right to work if fully capable. If they are able to
perform the job despite being pregnant, women must be permitted to work on
the same terms as everyone else.2 33 Specifically, this means that employers
cannot force pregnant women to take leave or modified duty irrespective of
their own capacities. Police officer Kimberly Allison-LeBlanc sued for reinstate-
ment after the office of state police applied its policy that "[a] pregnant officer
disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by [proxy]." W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472
U.S. 400, 416 n.24 (1985) (adopting and quoting the BFOQ test from 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1984)).
Some of the airline pregnancy cases predate Criswell but nonetheless apply a similar analysis. See, e.g.,
Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984).
229. 649 F.2d 670, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1980).
230. Id. at 675 (citing Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 421-22 (N.D. Cal.
1977)).
231. See id. at 676.
232. Levin, 730 F.2d at 995-96 (upholding policy requiring flight attendants to discontinue flying
upon discovery of pregnancy); In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F Supp. 249, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(upholding the exclusion of all pregnant flight attendants during the third trimester and permitting
airline to require medical certification after thirteen weeks of pregnancy), aff'd sub nom. In re Pan Am.
World Airways, 905 F.2d 1457 (1lth Cir. 1990); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 74-250-A, 1976
WL 615, at *5-7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1976), aff'd per curiam, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding
policy requiring flight attendants to discontinue flying upon discovery of pregnancy).
233. See, e.g., Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that
"[p]regnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other
employees" (quoting S. REP. No. 95-331, at 3 (1977))).
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shall not be allowed to remain on patrol status" to her.234 The court deemed the
policy, under which a "pregnant police officer was automatically deemed
disabled due to her condition," to constitute "discrimination per se.
' 235
Pregnancy does not, however, provide any kind of safe harbor from adverse
employment decisions-pregnant women can be fired, laid off, or treated badly
just like everyone else who works at the whim of his or her employer. The right
to work if capable simply means that women cannot be deprived of employment
opportunities or benefits because of pregnancy.236 Recall Jessica Maldonado,
who could have been legally fired anticipatorily if the bank had produced
stronger evidence that she would need full time off for childbirth, or at the time
of birth as soon as she did not show up for a shift. 2 3 7 Her actual incapacity
would have been grounds for termination.
The PDA adopts, in effect, a policy of pregnancy-blindness. This may seem
like a small guarantee, but this aspect of the PDA effectively ended the most
common employer policies regarding pregnancy. After 1978, covered employ-
ers could no longer openly refuse to hire pregnant women, force them to take
leave at a particular point during pregnancy, or require them to stay away for a
period of time after childbirth-policies that were once commonplace. Analo-
gous state laws provide the same protection for a capable pregnant woman's
right to work. New York's human rights law, for example, prohibits an employer
from compelling a pregnant employee to take a leave of absence "unless the
employee is prevented by such pregnancy from performing the activities in-
volved in the job or occupation in a reasonable manner., 238
Because the right to work flows from capacity, the legal definition of capacity
becomes important. Does it contemplate only the woman's physical capability
of performing a job or her ability to perform it without injuring a fetus? "Fetal
protection policies," in which women were excluded or otherwise restricted
from jobs or tasks based on potential danger to their unborn babies regardless of
ability or willingness to perform the job, were commonplace in certain occupa-
tions, particularly those where workers were exposed to hazardous substances
or conditions.239 In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., employees challenged a
policy that expressly excluded women who were pregnant or capable of bearing
234. Allison-LeBlanc v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 671 So. 2d 448, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
235. Id. at 452-53; see also Greenberg, supra note 70, at 225 (discussing successful complaint by
state troopers who had been put on "temporary modified duty" against their will solely because they
were pregnant).
236. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "an employer
can dismiss an employee for excessive absenteeism, even if the absences were a direct result of the
employee's pregnancy"); AMENDING TrTLE VII, CIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, S. REP'. No. 95-331, at 6
(1977) (observing that "employers will no longer be permitted to force women who become pregnant to
stop working regardless of their ability to continue").
237. Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 767-68.
238. N.Y. Exac. LAW § 296(l)(g) (McKinney Supp. 2009).
239. WoMEN's WoRK, MEN's WORK, supra note 167, at 46 (reporting estimate by federal officials that
fetal protection policies "close at least 100,000 jobs to women").
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children from jobs at a battery manufacturing plant that involved lead expo-
sure. 240 Before Title VII Was enacted, Johnson Controls excluded women
altogether from battery-manufacturing jobs. 4 1 Once that policy became unlaw-
ful, it first adopted a policy warning pregnant and fertile women not to choose
jobs with lead exposure because of potential risk to a fetus but then later shifted
to an outright ban on fertile women.242
The Court struck down the fetal-protection policy, holding that under the
BFOQ exception to Title VII's ban on sex discrimination or directly under the
PDA, risk to a woman's fetus is not an aspect of her capacity to work.24 3 The
"safety" exception that had developed in BFOQ cases did not extend to the
safety of a fetus. While a particular job may pose genuine risk to gestating or
future offspring, the decision whether to tolerate it must be left to the individual
woman. In other words, employers cannot define a woman's capacity to work
by perceived or actual risks to maternal or fetal health.
This ruling was important for pregnant women's access to work but was also
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, employers can no longer deprive
women of work opportunities because of potential risks to fetuses; on the other
hand, as discussed below, women who seek to avoid such risks may not have
the right to alternative duties or other accommodations. Employers can legally
frame the "choice" that is left to women under decisions like Johnson Controls
as all-or-nothing, permitting women who are capable of working during preg-
nancy to continue their jobs on the same terms as all other employees but
forcing women who are incapable-by virtue of true physical incapacity or
refusal to take certain risks-to leave their jobs either temporarily or perma-
nently.244 This rule certainly has a class-based effect as well because women
from lower socioeconomic status are more likely to hold jobs that pose hazards
in the first place and less likely to be able to choose safe pregnancy over
income.
3. The Right To Leave During Periods of Incapacity
For pregnant women who are incapacitated by pregnancy-related disability,
the PDA grants only a comparative right to leave. Under the second clause of
the PDA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Guerra, employees with
pregnancy-based disability must get at least as much leave as those temporarily
disabled for other reasons.245 Although there is no ceiling on the benefits an
240. 499 U.S. 187, 190-91 (1991).
241. Id. at 191.
242. Id. at 191-92.
243. Id. at 203-04, 206.
244. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183, 1191 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(upholding employer's refusal to accommodate pregnant nurse's request to avoid treating AIDS patients
because of perceived increased risk). On Johnson Controls generally, see Alison E. Grossman, Note,
Striking Down Fetal Protection Policies: A Feminist Victory?, 77 VA. L. REv. 1607 (1991).
245. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987).
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employer can provide for pregnancy-based disability, as long as the benefit
corresponds to the "actual physical disability," there is no absolute floor ei-
ther.24 6 Employers can safely stiff all temporary disabled employees, subject
only to the remote possibility of triggering disparate impact liability. Although
harsh leave policies have, in a small number of cases (none of them recent),
been successfully challenged under disparate impact theory,24 7 they have also
been upheld in some cases, including by a number of appellate courts in the last
decade.248
As discussed above, the FMLA is a more reliable source of leave for
pregnancy-related disability than the PDA. If eligible, employees have an
absolute right to medically necessary leave, though the disability often outlasts
the permissible leave period. Like the PDA, however, the FMLA is of little use
for pregnant women with only partial incapacity. As Catherine Albiston has
noted, it "does little to help pregnant women who are forced out of their jobs
even though they could work with minor accommodations. '249 Here, state laws
can be important if they provide greater access to leave for pregnant women.
California, for example, requires employers to permit women up to four months
leave for disability related to pregnancy or childbirth.25 ° California also uses the
state disability insurance program to provide some paid leave to workers who
have to take time off to care for an ill family member or to bond with a new
246. Id. at 290. Policies that provide leave or benefits beyond the period of actual disability can be
challenged as sex discrimination unless also made available to fathers. See, e.g., Schafer v. Bd. of Pub.
Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990) (invalidating one-year childbearing leave made available only
to female employees because there was no evidence that "normal maternity disability ... extends to
one year"). Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions, is
unusual in requiring some absolute accommodations for pregnant students, including student-athletes,
regardless of how other temporarily disabled students are treated. See Brake, supra note 49, at 339.
247. See U.S. EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (invalidating
policy prohibiting sici4 leave during first year of employment on disparate impact grounds); Miller-
Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Mont. 1984), vacated by Miller-Wohl
Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), reinstated by Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of
Labor & Indus., 744 P.2d 871, 874 (Mont. 1987) (holding that one-year no-leave policy had a disparate
impact on women); see also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819-20 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer on validity of ten-day maximum leave policy
that fell "considerably short of the period generally recognized in human experience as the respite
needed to bear a child" and remanding for determination of the need for such a policy).
248. See Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding, against
a disparate impact challenge, a policy limiting leave within the first ninety days of employment to three
days); Donneyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding, against a
disparate impact challenge, the discharge of a pregnant employee for absenteeism after she was deemed
ineligible for leave under the FMLA).
249. Catherine Albiston, Anti-Essentialism and the WorkFamily Dilemma, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER
L. & JUST. 30, 38-39 (2005) (discussing Harvendir v. Norton Co., 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 560
(N.D.N.Y. 1997), for the proposition that, while the FMLA requires employers to make leave available
for pregnancy-related disability, "it does not require employers to structure work so that pregnant
women can continue working during their pregnancy").
250. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(a) (Deering Supp. 2009).
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child.251 Although concerted efforts have been made to expand the federal
FMLA, all proposals have failed to become law.2 52
B. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR PREGNANCY
The law provides robust protection for a pregnant woman's right to work, as
long as she can perform her job on the same terms as she did when not pregnant
or as required by her employer. She may also be entitled to leave in some
circumstances if her capacity is partially or totally impaired, though often this
will be without pay. As discussed in the previous sections, a pregnant woman is
entitled to be assessed based on her actual capacity to work. She is also entitled
to work if capable and, in some circumstances, is entitled to leave pending a
resumption of her work capacity. The crucial question not yet covered is
whether she has a right to workplace accommodations that may permit her to
continue working despite temporarily impaired capacity. Federal law all but
abandons the pregnant woman in need of such accommodations. She has no
absolute right to work unless she is able to fully perform the duties of her job,
and she has no absolute right to the accommodations that might allow her to do
SO.
1. Existing Law on the Pregnant Woman's Right To Work
The PDA does not provide pregnant employees with the absolute right to
reasonable or necessary accommodations. An employer cannot refuse to make
workplace accommodations to a pregnant woman because he resents her pres-
ence or believes working will hinder her health or her family's development.
But neither is the employer required to make even minor accommodations, even
if the consequence is that the pregnant woman must leave her job.
a. The PDA's Comparative Right of Accommodation. Although the Americans
with Disabilities Act may also seem like a natural source of rights in this
context, most courts have held it inapplicable to disability arising from a normal
pregnancy.25 3 Likewise, although the Due Process Clause has been read to
251. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301(a)(1) (Deering 2005) (providing six weeks paid leave for
birth or adoption of a child). A handful of other states also provide paid pregnancy or parental leave.
See NAT'L P'SHWn FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 215 (listing state laws).
252. See, e.g., Govtrack.us, H.R. 1369: Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-1369 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
253. See, e.g., Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting that
"the majority of federal courts hold that pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a disability
under the ADA"); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 474 (D. Kan. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiff's ADA claim because her "pregnancy was not unusual or abnormal" and the
"conditions she experienced with the pregnancy were not outside the normal range"); see also Colette
G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993) (urging application of the ADA to pregnancy-
related disability); D'Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the
Workplace: A Proposal To Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1411 (1996)
(same). The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, signed into law in 2008, may provide
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preclude pregnancy-based stereotyping, it does not provide any right to work-
place accommodations necessitated by pregnancy.254 The PDA is thus the only
potential source under federal law for a pregnant woman's right to workplace
accommodations.
An employer covered by the PDA or an analogous state law must provide
accommodations only to the extent it provides them for other temporarily
disabled employees or as required by disparate impact theory.255 Any right to
workplace accommodations under the PDA is thus comparative rather than
absolute. The PDA takes its cues from a formal equality framework, which
defines rights in comparison to those possessed by similarly situated groups.
The PDA designates other temporarily disabled workers-those "not so af-
fected, but similar in their ability or inability to work"-as the appropriate
comparison group. Thus, the question of entitlement to accommodations turns
on whether the employer has provided or would provide a similar accommoda-
tion to a member of the comparison group. If not, the employer can safely
withhold it from the pregnant woman, subject only to the minimal requirements
of disparate impact law discussed below. Judge Richard Posner wrote in a
well-known pregnancy discrimination case:
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the urgings of feminist
scholars ... require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to
make it easier for pregnant women to work.., to make it as easy, say, as it is
for their spouses to continue working during pregnancy. Employers can treat
pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
employees.256
The comparative right of accommodation has proven to be quite limited in
practice.257 It can be difficult, for example, to find comparators to illustrate that
the employer has deviated from the equal treatment principle. The search for a
comparator is often elusive, as Kimberley Troupe, a saleswoman at Lord &
Taylor department store who suffered chronic and debilitating morning sickness
some protection for pregnant women because of its broader definition of "major life activity,"
impairment of which triggers the ADA workplace provisions. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
254. See, e.g., Roller v. City of San Mateo, 572 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Due process does
not require the city to provide alternative employment for its employees when disabled. It simply
precludes the city from depriving pregnant women of the employment theretofore enjoyed on the basis
of an irrebuttable presumption as to working capacity.").
255. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[U]nder the PDA,
employers are not required to give pregnant women special treatment; they must only treat them the
same as all other employees.").
256. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
257. See generally Albiston, supra note 249, at 38 ("Women who, because of pregnancy, are
temporarily unable to perform their jobs as those jobs are currently structured continue to find
themselves in a difficult position.").
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during pregnancy, discovered.258 She was fired for chronic tardiness right before
she began maternity leave. 259 The court suggested that to prevail under a
pregnancy discrimination theory, she needed to prove that her employer would
not have fired a "hypothetical Mr. Troupe" with a similar record of tardiness and
plans to take a medically necessary leave. 260 This sets a high bar for proof.
Recent cases challenging employers' light-duty policies reveal another poten-
tial limit on the comparative right of accommodation. Recall the potential
conflicts identified in section I.C above. Many of the conflicts between preg-
nancy and work could be reduced or avoided by temporary modification of job
duties or location. Colloquially, these are referred to as "light-duty" assign-
ments. A law enforcement officer who does desk duty in place of patrol is a
typical example of such an arrangement. Many employers provide light-duty
assignments to those injured on the job but not those injured off the job. Under
such a policy, a woman with a pregnancy-related disability could not receive a
light-duty assignment, even though at least a subset of other temporarily
disabled employees could. In all but one case, courts have upheld these policies
against PDA challenges, ruling that they are "pregnancy-blind," and therefore
valid, because the eligibility does not expressly turn on pregnancy.26 These
cases, in my view, are wrongly decided, in part because they ignore the PDA's
mandate that pregnant women be treated as well as others "similar in their
ability or inability to work"; the PDA does not delegate to employers the right
to select any neutral comparison group for the purpose of granting workplace
accommodations. It specifically directs them to focus on capacity alone. Yet,
courts have been surprisingly tacit in evaluating these policies.262
b. The Limits of Disparate Impact Protection. In theory, disparate impact law
should compensate for some of, the shortcomings of the PDA's comparative
right of accommodation by invalidating some of the harsh employment policies
that make it difficult for women to work through pregnancy. Under Title VII,
258. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 738. For greater exploration of this suggestion, see Jessica Carvey Manners, Note,
The Search for Mr Troupe: The Need To Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy Discrimination
Act Cases, 66 OiO ST. LJ.' 209 (2005). See also Greenberg, supra note 70, at 240-47 (considering
difficulties with finding a comparator); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2187 (1994) (noting
that "[c]ourts have ... been reluctant to draw an easy inference of invidious motive in claims of
disparate treatment based on pregnancy").
261. See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding light-
duty policy restricted to on-the-job injuries); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 E3d 1309, 1312-13
(11 th Cir. 1999) (same); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (same).
262. But see Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 08-2723-CV, 2009 WL 277843 1, at * 1 (2d Cir. Sept.
3, 2009) (noting that pregnant police officers were successful in invalidating a policy that did not allow
them to be put on light-duty status). For details of the case, see Joanna L. Grossman, A Big Win for
Pregnant Police Officers: A Jury Finds a New York County's Police Department Liable for Failing To
Accommodate Pregnancy-Related Disability, FDLAw's WanT, June 27, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/grossman/20060627.html.
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employees can challenge "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.' 2 63 Because the PDA
extended Title VIl's protections to pregnant workers, they, too, can rely on this
theory of unintentional discrimination. 26' Though this cause of action has
theoretical promise in the pregnancy context, as Reva Siegel outlined more than
two decades ago,265 it has proved decidedly ineffectual thus far.266 The reality is
that plaintiffs almost never prevail on such claims in the pregnancy context.
There are a number of reasons why disparate impact theory has not turned out
to be more useful for pregnant workers. Although most courts acknowledge the
theoretical existence of disparate impact theory under the PDA, 6 7 some refuse
to apply it in its true form. These courts treat the second clause of the
PDA-which guarantees that pregnant workers are treated "the same as" other
temporarily disabled workers similar in their ability or inability to work-as a
ceiling on what accommodations employers can be forced to provide. Judge
Posner, for example, in Troupe, described disparate impact as a "permissible
theory" under the PDA but cautioned that "properly understood," it was not a
"warrant for favoritism" and could not be used to prevent employers from
treating pregnant workers "as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpreg-
nant employees., 268 Other courts have taken a similar tack-claiming to recog-
nize disparate impact law but refusing to allow it to provide anything more than
a comparative right to accommodation or leave. The Fifth Circuit, in Stout v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., refused to apply disparate impact to claims
in which the plaintiff's only challenge is that the amount of sick leave granted
to employees is insufficient to accommodate the time off required in a typical
263. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Courts have held that
disparate impact theory can be used to challenge terms and conditions of employment, as well as hiring
practices. See, e.g., Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 980 (7th Cir.
1988).
264. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[D]isparate impact is a
permissible theory of liability under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as it is under other provisions of
Title VII.").
265. See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 956 (1985) (arguing for recognition of disparate impact theory under the PDA).
266. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 751
(2006) (noting that "pregnancy cases typically fail under the disparate impact approach").
267. It is perhaps worth noting that the federal government has filed briefs arguing against the
availability of disparate impact theory in pregnancy cases. See, e.g., Scherr, 867 F.2d at 977-78 & n. 1;
Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 662-63
(2001) (discussing same).
268. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738; see also Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 E3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir.
1999) ("Appellee, however, was under no obligation to extend this accommodation to pregnant
employees. The PDA does not require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employ-
ees." (emphasis added)); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Urbano's
claim is thus not a request for relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential treatment;
it is a demand not satisfied by the PDA." (emphasis added)).
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pregnancy. To hold otherwise would be to transform the PDA into a guarantee
of medical leave for pregnant employees, something we have specifically held
that the PDA does not do.269
These courts, in other words, tend to equate any remedy for disparate impact
as mandating "preferential treatment," which they view as violating the PDA.27 °
This view of the second clause negates the ability of disparate impact theory to
operate as any sort of backstop or absolute floor.
Even when courts are not openly dismissive of disparate impact claims,
plaintiffs have not met with much success. One potential obstacle is the inability
to identify, as required under the statute, a particular "employment practice" that
produces the disparate impact. Courts have held, for example, that any discretion-
ary decision-such as the decision to deny a particular woman's request for
pregnancy-related leave-cannot be challenged as a practice. 271 Another held
that the elimination of an attorney's part-time position is not an "employment
practice" for purposes of a disparate impact challenge.272
A second obstacle arises when courts prejudge the merits of the claim by
refusing to apply disparate impact analysis to "legitimate" job requirements like
attendance. As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-
Illinois, in which it refused to allow a pregnant employee to attack an absentee-
ism policy, "[t]he concept of disparate impact was developed and is intended for
cases in which employers impose eligibility requirements that are not really
necessary for the job. 27 3 Disparate impact theory can be used to challenge
"rules or practices that arbitrarily exclude pregnant women" but not to argue
"that the employer should be required to excuse pregnant employees from
having to satisfy the legitimate requirements of their job. 274 But the Dormeyer
court bypassed the mechanism by which that distinction is to be drawn:
disparate impact analysis. In the usual case, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case by showing that a particular employment practice has a disproportionate
impact on a protected class. The burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to
prove that the practice is nonetheless justified by "business necessity." It may
well be that many of the job requirements that pregnant workers have difficulty
satisfying indeed are justified by business necessity, but it is the employer's
burden to prove it if a disparate impact has been shown.275 Not all policies that
fall into legitimate categories-like leave or attendance policies-are in fact
269. 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
270. See, e.g., Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
("This Court recognizes the Supreme Court's opinion that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was not
intended to provide accommodations to pregnant employees when such accommodations rise to the
level of preferential treatment." (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 216-18 (1991))).
271. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
272. See Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997).
273. 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000).
274. Id. at 584.
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
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necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business.
A final, but important, obstacle is that courts tend to require statistical proof
of a disparate impact. Courts have been largely unwilling to accept non-
statistical showings of impact 276 or to rely on broader societal data to support a
claim of disparate impact. 277 And plaintiffs have been mostly unsuccessful in
making the requisite statistical showing,278 though it is hard to generalize about
the reasons for their failures. In many cases, the sample is just too small,
particularly in so-called non-traditional occupations for women. It is unlikely
that enough pregnant women will have been adversely affected by any particu-
lar policy to show a statistically significant impact. The same is true for smaller
employers.279 In other cases, there seems to be confusion about the proper
comparison groups for statistical analysis. 280 And, in a large number of cases,
statistical evidence is simply not offered, for reasons that are not obvious on a
cold record.281 Given these specific obstacles and the incredibly small number
of cases in which pregnant workers have prevailed on disparate impact claims,
it seems fair to conclude that the theory provides little meaningful protection for
pregnant workers beyond that provided by disparate treatment or formal policy
models of discrimination.28 2 Rethinking the best way to conceptualize "dispar-
ate impact" in the pregnancy context would be an appropriate next step.
Together, the limits of the comparative right of accommodation and courts'
anemic approach to disparate impact law in this context mean that pregnant
276. See Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff "'must offer "statistical
evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion"
of benefits because the beneficiaries would be women' (quoting Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr.,
95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir. 1996))); Maganuco v. Layden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 444
(7th Cir. 1991) ("'prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination"' requires plaintiff to
show "'gross statistical disparities"' (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307-08 (1977))).
277. See, e.g., Ilhardt, 118 F.3d at 1157 (refusing, in disparate impact case challenging the elimina-
tion of a part-time position, to take notice of studies showing that the majority of part-time workers are
women with child-care responsibilities).
278. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 1994); Davidson
v. Franciscan Health Sys., 82 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774-75 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Dimino v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 64 F. Supp. 2d 136, 157-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F Supp. 326, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Ahmad v. Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 n.2 (S.D. Ala. 1991);
Porter v. Kansas, 757 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (D. Kan. 1991).
279. See, e.g., Lang, 107 F3d at 1314 (finding "no evidence ... of a disproportionately adverse
impact on pregnant women" in part because employee conceded that employer was too small for
statistical analysis).
280. See, e.g., Maganuco, 939 F.2d at 443-44; O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d
868, 886-87 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
281. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999); Crnokrak v.
Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 744-45 (N.D. Il. 1993).
282. Christine Jolls has argued that disparate impact provides absolute protection against the
harshest employment policies that disadvantage pregnant workers. See Jolls, supra note 267, at 660-65.
While she is undoubtedly right that "the logic of disparate impact liability requires employers to
provide certain benefits, such as leave from work, to pregnant employees," id. at 660, the protection is
undermined by the reality that plaintiffs almost never prevail on disparate impact claims in the
pregnancy context.
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women in many cases do not have the right to continue working if pregnancy
has even minimally impaired their capacity.
2. Accommodation and Equal Citizenship
The existing legal regime is untenable when measured against the standard of
equal citizenship. By virtue of the law's failure to insist on reasonable accommo-
dation for the physical effects of pregnancy, women are systematically deprived
of the right to participate in paid work on equal terms and, thus, of equal social
citizenship.
The consequences of withholding light-duty or other workplace accommoda-
tions to pregnant employees can be severe. For many women who work in jobs
where significant physical exertion is required, or where the working environ-
ment is hazardous, an employer's failure to provide light-duty or make some
other modification is fatal to her ability to continue working. For those without
available leave, an employer's failure to provide a necessary accommodation is
tantamount to termination. For others, the lack of accommodation will cause
them to exhaust paid or unpaid leave, leaving none to use during recovery from
childbirth or when caring for a new baby. Those who do take leave will often do
so without pay and sometimes suffer dire economic consequences. Many on
unpaid leave will also lose seniority, benefits, and opportunities for advance-
ment.
Ironically, the lack of a right to reasonable accommodations means that
women will continue to lose ground in the occupations in which they need to
gain it most-those traditionally dominated by men.283 Women are less likely to
continue working through pregnancy when they hold jobs that require physical
exertion. Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth showed that
"strength requirements of the job had a significant effect on [pregnant workers']
exits from work.",284 Another study found evidence of increased risk of preterm
delivery among electrical equipment operators, janitors, textile workers, and
food service workers, compared with "markedly reduced" risk for teachers and
librarians. 285 A study in Connecticut found that women worked later into
pregnancy the "less hard the physical labor required" and the "more flexible the
283. There are "pink collar" jobs such as house cleaning or nursing that may also require heavy
work or create potentially hazardous conditions and are thus equally difficult for pregnant women to
maintain without accommodation. See, e.g., Women in Blue-Collar Labor, supra note 30, at 23. But
physical requirements are much more common in many traditionally male-dominated occupations.
284. Desai & Waite, supra note 25, at 560.
285. David A. Savitz et al., Maternal Occupation and Pregnancy Outcome, 7 EPIDEMOLOGY 269, 270
(1996) (studying effect of occupation on late pregnancy outcomes based on data from the National
Maternal and Infant Health Survey); see also Nicole Mamelle et al., Prematurity and Occupational
Activity During Pregnancy, 3 AM. J. EPmEMOLOGY 309, 313 (1984) (finding greater risk of premature
birth with certain occupations over others); Martha Tabor, Pregnancy and Heavy Work: What Is the
Effect of Strenuous Activity in Pregnant Women in the Manual Trades, OccuPAIONAL HEALTH &
SAFETY, Feb. 1983, at 19, 20 (noting results of one survey showing increased risk of miscarriage and
birth defects among pregnant miners).
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work conditions. 286 The data showing an inverse correlation between age and
educational level, on the one hand, and likelihood of work during and late into
pregnancy also support these findings.28 7 One team of researchers suggested
that it may well be
the case that jobs that require more education are more conducive to accommo-
dating pregnant women. Women working at these jobs may be more likely to
sit during the day, have easy access to rest facilities, not engage in manual
labor, and not be exposed to hazardous materials or conditions. Also, their
schedules may be more flexible, allowing for ease of scheduling medical
appointments, late arrivals, and early departures. 288
These data points support what feminist scholars have long argued: many
workplaces are designed around the prototypical male worker, which produces
conflict and, in many cases, the need for women to be "accommodated., 28 9 As
Maxine Eichner has argued, "Demands of physical strength beyond that which
most women possess, scheduling that conforms to typically male life patterns,
job descriptions calling for stereotypically masculine traits, and myriad other
requirements modeled on male characteristics perpetuate women's exclusion
from traditionally male jobs., 290 The male default in workplace and job design
has led to many cases testing standard work requirements like height, weight,
strength, and running speed, challenges occasioned by the influx of women into
workplaces and jobs designed without them in mind.29 ' Most of these cases are
litigated under disparate impact theory, and the results have been mixed.
Disparate impact law is not a panacea, but it has been useful in forcing some
employers to restructure workplaces or job descriptions to avoid inadvertently
restrictive standards and the exclusion of women that cannot be justified by
286. Chavkin, supra note 62, at 203 (citing Nina Jane Kleinberg, Pregnant on the Job: An
Exploratory Study of the Experience of Working During Pregnancy 112-30 (May 1981) (unpublished
M.S.N. thesis, Yale University School of Nursing) (on file with the Cushing/Whitney Medical Library,
Yale University)).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
288. JOHNSON & DowNs, supra note 32, at 6.
289. Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work that Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender
Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1398-99 (1988); see also JOAN WIuAMs,
UNBENDiNG GENDER: WHY FAMiLY AND WORK CorL'Icr AND WHAT To Do ABouT IT 13-39 (2000)
(criticizing the "ideal worker" norm as driven by a male prototype).
290. Eichner, supra note 289, at 1398-99.
291. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977) (challenging height and weight
requirements for correctional officers in maximum security prison); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transit Auth.,
308 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (challenging minimum run time requirement for transit police
officers); Evans v. City of Evanston, 881 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1989) (challenging agility test
requirement for firefighters); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977) (challenging
minimum height requirements for pilots); Joanna Grossman, What Defines "Business Necessity" in the
Discrimination Context? A Federal Appellate Case Grapples with How Fast Transit Police Officers
Must Run, FINDLAw's WRIr, Nov. 19, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20021119.htm
(discussing Lanning).
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business necessity. There have also been a number of recent cases in which
women have challenged the lack of worksite restroom facilities because biology
and social norms make urinating in public more difficult for them.29 2
Pregnancy simply exacerbates. this tendency of predesigned and inflexible
workplaces and jobs to exclude as women seek to integrate across the occupa-
tional spectrum. There is no question that most workplaces and jobs have been
designed without consideration of the particular needs or limitations of pregnant
workers. As one review of the well-being of pregnant workers observed,
"working environments and working conditions are not well suited to pregnant
women." 293 Until the last few decades, working during pregnancy, particularly
into the later stages, was the exception, not the rule.2 94 And the high degree of
occupational segregation confined women to certain jobs, many of which did
not conflict significantly with the physical effects of pregnancy.295 Although
occupational segregation by sex is still an entrenched problem-more women
work as secretaries than in any other job296 -women have made "inroads into
nontraditional occupations," most dramatically during the 1970s, but continuing
today.
2 9 7
Accommodation is the link between pregnant working women and equal
social citizenship. The failure of current law to acknowledge a pregnant wom-
an's right to work despite temporary, partial impairments or risks systematically
undermines the ability of women to attain workplace equality.2 98 It shortcuts the
careers of individual women, exacerbates the glass ceiling many women face,
and, perhaps even worse, reinforces a long history of occupational segregation.
Using equal social citizenship as a "yardstick, ' 299 we see that existing law's
292. See, e.g., DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting, in dicta, that
the absence of restroom facilities on a construction site could violate Title VII if it "deters women
(normal women, not merely women who are abnormally sensitive) but not men from seeking or holding
a particular type of job"); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 387-89 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
disparate impact claim due to lack of facilities); see also Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's
Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 1655-56 (2007) (discussing Judge Posner's assertion in DeClue that
lack of restroom facilities could constitute disparate impact).
293. Pattison & Gross, supra note 135, at 84.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 10-28.
295. Even today, there is a long list of jobs in which women occupy less than 25% of the positions.
See WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, QUICK FAcrs ON NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS FOR WOMEN
(2009), http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/nontra2008.pdf.
296. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 16. The top five "most prevalent occupations" for women
in 2008 also included registered nurses, elementary and middle school teachers, cashiers, and retail
salespersons. See id.
297. WOMEN's BUREAU, supra note 295. For comparison, see WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NONTRADITONAL OCCUPATIONS FOR WOMEN IN 1999 (1999), http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/nontra99.htm.
For a detailed analysis of occupational segregation by sex through the mid-1980s, see WOMEN's WORK,
MEN'S WORK, supra note 167, at 18-36.
298. Cf. Magid, supra note 194, at 821 (2001) ("Increasingly, women's ability to give birth and
continue to work seems to be in spite of, rather than because of, passage of the PDA.").
299. See LISTER, supra note 89, at 5-6 (noting historical importance of equal citizenship as a goal of
rights movements and proposing a focus on citizenship in the women's movement as both a "process"
and an "outcome").
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failure to insist on even minimal accommodations for the physical effects of
pregnancy means that women are not equal participants in the workplace.
Women are thus consigned to a second-class status by virtue of this legal
framework.
As aspiration rather than yardstick, the concept of equal social citizenship
militates in favor of defining equality by reference to outcomes rather than
treatment. This returns us to the 1980s debate over the proper way to conceptual-
ize equality in the pregnancy context, in which feminists divided over whether
to seek pregnancy-related accommodations or, instead, insist on a pure equal
treatment principle.3°° In that context, Herma Hill Kay argued for an "equality
of opportunity" approach, which would provide a justification for "removing
barriers which prevent individuals from performing according to their abili-
ties."3 °1 She proposed an "episodic analysis" of pregnancy, which would "avoid
penalizing women as the result of their reproductive behavior and thus permit
us to accommodate pregnancy within a legal and philosophical framework that
affirms the equality of women and men."3°2 She conceives of the pregnant
woman as someone who, "unlike a man who engages in reproductive behavior,
[is] placed at a temporary disadvantage with respect to equality of opportuni-
ty."303 But the inequality "does not stem from an innate difference in ability, but
rather from a condition or circumstance that prevents certain uses or develop-
ments of that ability.' '3°4 She concludes that the law should accommodate the
temporary impairment in order to provide equal opportunity for men and
women, both of whom reproduce, to put their innate abilities to use in the
workplace. 30 5 "In order to maintain the woman's equality of opportunity during
her pregnancy," she posits, "we should modify as far as reasonably possible
those aspects of her work where her job performance is adversely affected by
the pregnancy., 30
6
Kay's distinction between temporary impairments, on the one hand, and
innate ability, on the other, is at the heart of the concept of equal citizenship. All
members of society should have the same opportunity to capitalize on their
innate abilities, unimpeded by formal or other barriers to equal participation. In
her landmark opinion in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
invoked this same conception of equal citizenship to invalidate Virginia Military
Institute's longstanding male-only admissions policy.30 7 Ginsburg wrote that
full citizenship requires "equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
300. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
301. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case ofPregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WomEN's L.J. 1,
26 (1985).
302. Id. at 2.
303. Id. at 26.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 37-38.
306. Id. at 27.
307. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
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contribute to society based on [one's] individual talents and capacities., 30 8 This
conception of citizenship also better allows for the celebration of women's
differences while still ensuring equal opportunity, thus avoiding the disputes
that have plagued the equality debate.
Justice Ginsburg again invoked this definition of equal citizenship in her
dissent in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, a recent case involving pregnancy discrimina-
tion.30 9 The case involved questions raised by AT&T's refusal to grant service
credit for pregnancy-related disability leaves taken between 1968 and 1974,
before passage of the PDA, despite granting credit to other temporarily disabled
workers who took similar leaves, which left the women with lower pension
payments for life.3 1° Seven Justices sided with AT&T because they viewed the
initial different treatment as lawful at the time.31 In her dissent, Justice
Ginsburg criticized the majority for reading the PDA to allow women to be.
penalized in perpetuity for taking pregnancy-related leaves.312 She condemned
the refusal to heed the PDA's "core command" that employers must "cease and
desist" disadvantaging female employees on the basis of pregnancy. 313 She also
linked the particular situation raised by Hulteen to a broader history of inequal-
ity for pregnant workers, one in which "[c]ertain attitudes about pregnancy and
childbirth, throughout human history, have sustained pervasive, often law-
sanctioned, restrictions on a woman's place among paid workers and active
citizens. 3 14 Kay's and Ginsburg's analyses support the claim for greater accom-
modation of pregnancy as a matter of equal social citizenship.
3. Preliminary Thoughts on Accommodation
Concern for women's equal citizenship dictates greater workplace accommo-
dations for pregnant workers. The law's emphasis should be on preserving
women's innate capacity through a temporary period in which that capacity
might be altered. Such an approach would trade our current tendency to equate
pregnancy-blindness with equality or fairness for an accommodation approach
that would better promote full and equal participation of women in the paid
workforce. Disability rights scholars have offered nuanced analyses of the
benefits and challenges of accommodating disabled workers, many of which are
analogous here.31 5 One clear benefit is the role accommodation mandates play
308. Id. at 532.
309. 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1978 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 1967 (majority opinion). For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Joanna L.
Grossman, AT&T v. Hulteen: The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Once-Pregnant Retirees, FINDLAw'S
Wrr, May 26, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090526.html.
311. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. at 1970. The ruling turned on the majority's determination that the pensions
were based on a "bona fide seniority system" and thus received special deference. Id. at 1969-70.
312. Id. at 1976 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 1975-76.
314. Id. at 1978.
315. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (urging greater consideration of the cost
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in forcing employers, and society, to "question[] the inherency of established
workplace norms. 316
To be sure, there are risks to mandating accommodation. It may, first and
foremost, perpetuate stereotypes about the incapacity of pregnant women to
work, the overcoming of which has been the centerpiece of modem pregnancy
discrimination law.3 17 Also, it may breed resentment from coworkers or supervi-
sors, who perceive accommodations to be preferential treatment.3 18 An accom-
modation mandate may also foster paternalistic attitudes, encouraging employers
and others to invade pregnant women's privacy and autonomy.319 Mandatory
accommodation may deter employers from hiring women because they will
perceive them as more costly, or encourage employers to find covert ways to
drive pregnant or potentially pregnant women from the workplace to avoid the
obligation to accommodate. 320 Finally, greater emphasis on accommodation
may also undermine the moral force of antidiscrimination law because it departs
from the conventional notions of bias that unquestionably need to be eliminated
from workplace policies and practice. Michael Selmi, for example, has argued
that disparate impact theory, through which accommodation rights are some-
times gained, has "stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of inten-
of disability-related accommodations and their effectiveness at expanding work opportunities for the
disabled); Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 839 (2008) (arguing that
courts should pay greater attention to the ways in which accommodations for the disabled benefit all
workers when considering whether they impose an undue hardship to the employer); Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 125 (considering a negligence-based approach to defining reasonable accommo-
dations under the ADA); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommoda-
tions, 53 Duar L.J. 79, 84-85 (2003) (proposing a "law and economics framework for assessing
disability-related accommodations").
316. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidis-
crimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004) (arguing that the accommodations mandated in the
ADA force employers to reconsider the "inherence" of workplace structures).
317. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 64, at 22 (noting, in the context of pregnancy accommodation,
that "[h]ighlighting differences stereotypes gender roles and provides a justification for imposing
harmful limitations on women"). See generally Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 260 (discussing
concern about stereotyping related to accommodation); supra text accompanying notes 41-45 (review-
ing current studies on pregnancy bias in the workplace).
318. Studies have shown, for example, that work is usually reassigned to coworkers when an
employee takes maternity leave and that many workers perceive that pregnant women receive preferen-
tial treatment in the workplace. See, e.g., Gueutal & Taylor, supra note 7, at 475 (noting, among other
findings, that most study subjects "felt that organizations were doing too much in terms of reducing
workloads and schedules for [pregnant employees] and were personally unwilling to take on additional
duties to assist a [pregnant employee]").
319. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimina-
tion Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace,'24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 115 (1989) (expressing
concern that accommodation might "simply reconstitute [women's] role in a new and more oppressive
patriarchy"); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKI.EY J. Era'. & LAB. L. 283,
328 (2003) (noting that a mandate to accommodate caregiving obligations could "translate into
paternalism, as the beneficiaries are viewed as uniquely in need of extra assistance or protection" and
that "[p]aternalism, like resentment, could lead to further limits on women's opportunities and roles").
320. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 64, at 23 (noting that cost spreading and better enforcement of
discrimination laws could counteract any incentive for employers to "avoid hiring women to avoid the
costs of accommodating their pregnancy").
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tional discrimination. ' 321 Samuel Bagenstos has argued that efforts to bolster
Title VIl's ability to reach "structural" discrimination lack the "generally ac-
cepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law.",322 These concerns
are real but insufficient to overcome the countervailing benefits. At a minimum,
a legal framework that keeps pregnant women in their jobs will create a
counter-narrative of a woman's proper place. And employers may well discover,
as they did in the FMLA context,323 that the cost and inconvenience of
providing reasonable accommodations is less than they fear.324
An accommodation model for pregnant workers might take different forms,
but the essence is to maximize the opportunity for pregnant women to continue
working despite the temporary physical effects of pregnancy. 325 In the context
of pregnancy, this approach might entail short-term modifications of tasks, or
assignment to alternative positions, when justified by a particular woman's
medical condition.32 6 Making such adjustments would enable more pregnant
women to stay at work, especially those who labor in physically demanding jobs; this
is an important precondition for their capturing the citizenship values of work.
As a matter of legal structure, an accommodation law could be modeled on
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which guarantees reasonable work-
place accommodations for disabled individuals that do not pose an undue
hardship on their employers.327 Accommodations could be granted simply by
amending the ADA to include pregnancy as a qualifying disability, thus bypass-
ing some of the doctrinal difficulties disabled workers have faced in trying to
access the rights granted under the statute. Courts have, however, been notori-
ously hostile to accommodation mandates generally, resulting in narrow interpre-
tations of statutory requirements and excessive deference to employer assertions
of hardship.328 It may be, then, that a narrower or more specific approach will
321. Michael Selni, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 781 (2006).
322. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L.
REv. 1, 3 (2006).
323. Grossman, supra note 208, at 52 (discussing survey results showing that employers "were able
to implement the leave policies required by the [FMLA] with minimal cost or administrative difficulty,
and with 'no noticeable effect' on productivity or profitability" (citations omitted)).
324. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 89 (2003) (citing human
resource literature to suggest that "it is far from clear that 'accommodation' is expensive in the context
of a restructured workplace").
325. Cf Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 125, at 38-39 (describing accommodation as asking "how
the job might be modified to enable more individuals to perform it" rather than "taking job descriptions
as a given").
326. See, e.g., Paul et al., supra note 64, at 158 ("To prevent musculoskeletal complaints [among
pregnant women at work], various measures are possible, for example, adapting the work situation,
changing the use of decision latitude, adapting workplace layout, and improving work posture and work
technique.").
327. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 125, at 5-14 (describing the right of accommodation
under the ADA).
328. See, e.g., Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommoda-
tion Provision To Redeem itle VII, 76 Thx. L. REv. 317, 323 (1997) (noting courts' failure to take a
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
ultimately be more protective than a general mandate of "reasonable accommo-
dation."
Another approach would be to work within the existing Title VII structure to
argue for greater accommodation of pregnancy-related disability. The EEOC
recently issued interpretive guidance that encourages employers to be more
flexible about task reassignment for pregnant workers, but this recommendation
is not binding beyond what the PDA requires. 329 Although there are inherent
limits within the existing statutory structure, enforcing employers' -equal treat-
ment obligations in the light-duty context and making greater use of disparate
impact theory could lead to modest improvement.
A third option would be to urge passage of a federal law modeled either on
state laws that deal directly with accommodations for pregnancy-related disabil-
ity or on state laws that target pregnancy accommodations directly. California,
for example, amended its Fair Employment and Housing Act in 1999 to respond
to three specific gaps in federal law.330 First, it requires employers to provide
"reasonable accommodation for an employee for conditions related to preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" if requested based on a doc-
tor's advice. 33 A pregnant woman who needed frequent breaks to go to the
bathroom, for example, might invoke this provision. Second, the law prohibits
employers from excluding pregnant women from any policy providing light-
duty assignments ("less strenuous or hazardous") to other temporarily disabled
employees. 332 Finally, even in the absence of a light-duty policy, the law
prohibits an employer from refusing a pregnant woman's medically supported
request for a transfer to light-duty "where that transfer can be reasonably
truly accommodationist approach to Title VII religious claims despite the law's "specific accommodation-
ist language"); Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1818 (2005) (arguing that the ADA's "accommodation mandate ... has been
limited by courts' interpretations").
329. See EEOC, supra note 47 (recommending that employers "reassign job duties that employees
are unable to perform because of pregnancy or other caregiving responsibilities" (emphasis omitted)).
330. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 (Deering Supp. 2009). Louisiana has adopted a nearly identical
law. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:342 (Supp. 2009); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(E)
(2003) (requiring employers to make reasonable efforts to transfer a pregnant employee if the
"employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the position held
by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus"); MiNN. STAT. § 363A.08 subdivs.
5, 6 (2008) (requiring employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for pregnancy-related disability).
331. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(1).
A woman is "disabled by pregnancy" if, in the opinion of her health care provider, she is
unable because of pregnancy to work at all or is unable to perform any one or more of the
essential functions of her job or to perform these functions without undue risk to herself, the
successful completion of her pregnancy, or to other persons.... [A] woman is also considered
to be "disabled by pregnancy" if she is suffering from severe "morning sickness" or needs to
take time off for prenatal care.
CAL. CODE REGs., tit. 2, § 7291.2 (g), (f) (1990).
332. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2). This provision eliminates the policies discussed above, which
tend to restrict light-duty assignments to employees with on-the-job injuries.
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accommodated., 333 There are other states that mandate accommodations for
pregnant workers under narrower circumstances.334 This provision dampens the
potential Hobson's choice created by UAW v. Johnson Controls-to continue
working in a dangerous job or forego employment. Under this provision, a
pregnant woman might be able to temporarily transfer to a less strenuous or
dangerous assignment in order to avoid unemployment and potential risk to
herself and her fetus. These laws provide a starting point for thinking about how
we might better accommodate the needs of pregnant workers.
CONCLUSION
Many scholars have called for an expansion of leave laws for pregnancy-
related disability as well as to accommodate the demands of parenting.335 But
greater attention needs to be paid to the justifications and mechanisms for
establishing more robust protection of a pregnant woman's right to work.3 36
This Article has set forth the theoretical justification for mandating greater
accommodation of pregnancy-related disability and the practical consequence
for failing to do so.
The story of pregnant women and work in the United States is an unfinished
one. The current pregnancy discrimination framework has been tremendously
important in opening up the American workplace to women, most of whom will
both work and become pregnant at some point. But the same emphasis on
individual capacity that was crucial to dismantling the long-held stereotypes
about the limitations and incapacities of pregnant women now serves as a
stumbling block to future progress towards workplace equality. The statutory
and constitutional frameworks have combined to eliminate most employment
disadvantages for pregnant women based solely on stereotype or overbroad
generalizations about the physical limitations of pregnancy and childbirth as
333. Id. § 12945(b)(3). This provision also specifies, though, that "no employer shall be required by
this section to create additional employment that the employer would not otherwise have created, nor
shall the employer be required to discharge any employee, transfer any employee with more seniority,
or promote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job." Id.
334. Illinois, for example, prohibits employers from refusing light-duty assignments for pregnant
law enforcement officers or firefighters "where that transfer can be reasonably accommodated." 775 ILL.
Comp. STAT. 5/2-1.02 (H) (2008); see also Tax. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.0079 (Vernon 2005) (requiring
"reasonable efforts to accommodate" a law enforcement officer with partial physical restriction because
of pregnancy and requiring transfer to a light-duty position upon medical necessity if one is available).
335. See generally Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps Towards
Effective Policies, 8 J.L. FAM. StruD. 1 (2006); Grossman, supra note 208; Michael Selmi, Is Something
Better than Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'V 65
(2004); Marc Mory & Lia Pistilli, Note, The Failure of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Alternative
Proposals for Contemporary American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & Enmp. L.J. 689 (2001).
336. On accommodation of pregnancy, see Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 260, at 2154 ("We
contend that given the substantial number of mothers in the work force, many of whom have career
aspirations, society must affirmatively accommodate pregnancy, not merely prevent pregnancy-based
discrimination."). See generally Calloway, supra note 64; Laura Schlictmann, Accommodation of
Pregnancy-Related Disabilities on the Job, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335 (1994); Millsap, supra
note 253.
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well as fetal-protection policies. But, the lack of a basic right to reasonable accommo-
dation of pregnancy-related disability overlooks the real physical effects of
pregnancy and childbirth on women and their employment opportunities.
A full exploration of an effective accommodations model is beyond the scope
of this Article. There are obviously many factors to be considered in designing
an appropriate legal model-organizational feasibility, employer cost, impact
on other employees, and other unintended consequences such as perpetuating
stereotypes about women in the workplace. However, our collective thinking so
far has been too fearful of mandatory accommodations. 337 It is often the case
that very minimal accommodations are required to enable a pregnant woman to
continue working. Consider the number of female actresses who have shielded
their pregnancies from audiences through the clever use of props or camera
angles, or convinced producers to rewrite an entire television or movie story
line to include a pregnancy. 338 While celebrities are no more "just like us" than
marathon runners, the techniques producers use to accommodate pregnant
actresses suggest that a little creativity goes a long way.
The consequence of persisting with our current antidiscrimination model that
guarantees equal treatment but fails to account for differences is the failure of
women's full citizenship potential. Access and integration are not one and the
same. As scholars have noted in other contexts, opening the door to a closed
institution is only the first step for historically disadvantaged groups: retaining
and integrating participation in that institution is a much longer and more
complicated process. 339 The current antidiscrimination model thus opens work-
place doors to pregnant and potentially pregnant women but offers little to
ensure they can make full use of their innate talents and capacities once inside.
Therefore, women are often individually deprived of economic security, as well
as other benefits of working, and, as a group, are relegated to a kind of
second-class citizenship. A genuine commitment to women's equal social citizen-
ship can be carried out only by a legal framework that accounts for the capacity
and potential incapacity of pregnant women. Both are essential to promoting
women's full participation in the workforce.
337. See, e.g., Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, 153 F.R.D. 689, 693 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("To
require an employer to make reasonable accommodations for a pregnant employee is to require the
employer to relinquish virtually all control over employees once they do become pregnant.").
338. Julia Louis-Dreyfus was pregnant twice while filming "Seinfeld," though her character Elaine Benes
was never pregnant See Wilipedia, Elaine Benes, http://en.wikipediaorgtwiki/ElaineBenes (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009) (noting her real-life pregnancies and the techniques used to hide them from the audience).
339. See, e.g., Am. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINIsHED AGENDA:
WOMEN N THE LEGAL PROFESSION 13 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/women
unfinishedagenda.pdf (noting the persistence of obstacles to equality for women lawyers despite
eradication of formal barriers to education and employment); Devon Carbado et al., After Inclusion 3
(Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 210, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1138795 ("[B]ecause of shifts in our legal and social norms about equality, the
context in which racial animus is practiced and experienced transcends the door of access and includes
the ladder of advancement.").
[Vol. 98:567
